Commitment to democracy in Mozambique : performance evaluations and cognition : evidence from round 2 of the Afrobarometer survey data by Shenga, Carlos
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 










Commitment to Democracy in Mozambique: Performance Evaluations 
and Cognition. 




A minor dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the award of 
the Degree of Master of Social Science in Political Studies, Democratic Governance 
Programme 
Department of Political Studies 












This work has not been previously submitted in whole, or in part, for award of any 
degree. It is my own work. Each significant contribution to, and quotation in, this 














This study explores Mozambicans' commitment to democracy by testing and examining 
cognitive and performance evaluation factors, using Round 2 of the Afrobarometer 
survey. It finds that Mozambicans are less committed to democracy than many other 
A.ji-icans but their levels of procedural understand of democracy are higher. My main 
findings are as follows: First, levels of in/ormation models are the main source of 
popular commitment to democracy. Second, both evaluations of economic and political 
peliormance matter for Mozambicans' commitment to democracy. Third, the effects of 
political peliormance matter more than economics. Fourth, people }vho have high levels 
of information (from nevI'S media use and formal education), discuss politics with friends 
or neighbors and obtain their inj(Jrmation from relative~v more independent sources 
(wch as participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more 
like~v to be committed democrats. F(fih, procedural understandings of democracy are 
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The Importance of Popular Commitment to Democracy in Mozambique 
What we presently know about Africans' commitment to democracy comes from a cross-
national survey based analysis of eleven Anglophone and one Francophone sub Saharan 
African countries. It finds that individual's cognitive awareness (including whether or not 
people understand democracy as a system of political procedures rather than economic 
outcomes, as well as how much interest in and information about politics they possess) is 
the principal source when tested simultaneously against competing explanations based on 
social structure, cultural values, institutional influences and performance evaluations 
(Mattes and Bratton, 2003; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). However, I 
examine popular commitment to democracy in the Lusophone African context of 
Mozambique. 
Mozambique may alter the existing findings because of the particular legacies that it 
inherited from Portuguese colonialism and the post independence civil war, especially its 
deleterious effects on formal education, news media and the availability of the 
independent, critical information necessary for democratic citizenship. 
Independent Mozambique inherited very low levels of literacy from its period of 
Portuguese colonialism. I Colonialism granted only primary formal education to natives 
who could attend only Catholic Church schools, of which they were required to change 
their native name to a Portuguese one and convert to the Catholic religion in order to 
finish their qualifications. Only Europeans, Asians and a few assimilated2 natives could 
attend secondary and high schools. After independence in 1975, the literacy rate 
I After independence, due to Frelimo nationalization policy, most skilled Portuguese workers left the 
country leaving the public administration without qualified human capital. To keep government institutions 
functioning. the Frelimo government imported skilled workers from the Soviet Union. Students with some 
secondary school but without teacher training were drafted to become teachers. 
C Assimilated were those natives that were socialized in western culture. Most of them were sons of white 









worsened as the country experienced 16 years of brutal civil war (1977-1992) which 
destroyed the schooling infrastructure? The literacy rate is now 46 percent.4 
In addition, Mozambique also inherited a very weak mass media network from the 
colonial period: one radio station (Radio Moc;ambique), and two daily and one weekly 
newspapers.5 Though the country now has relative media pluralism, few people have 
access to print or televised media. Very few newspapers are distributed outside of 
provincial capital cities leaving many towns, boroughs and rural area without any print 
media access. The public television created after the independence (1982) reached the 
country's second biggest city, Beira, only in 1994. It is now spread to provincial capital 
cities and few towns and boroughs, but no further. Rural areas do not have access to 
television. The lack of electricity also undermines internet access in these areas. 
But it is also important to replicate earlier studies in Mozambique because of the legacies 
of Frelimo' s communist style party-state system especially its control over society. To 
control the society, the party-state institutionalized at grass root levels a 'chief of ten 
households' (chefe de dez casas) beyond 'ward secretaries' (Secret(lrios de Bairrm) and 
(Z1'11a17lical groups (grupos dinamizadores). It also nationalized all public and private 
institutions and organizations, including barber and tailor shops. 
Under the party-state system, the state secret police closely monitored Mozambicans who 
listened to news from foreign broadcasts, like BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation), 
arguing that foreign influences would undermine the socialist project. Like in other 
, The existing school infrastructure was destroyed and all males 17 years and older had to do compulsory 
service in the army. By the end of 1980 the Renamo guerrillas controlled two-thirds of the country leaving 
the government confined to provincial capital cities. In these cities the few school vacancies were reserved 
only for successful students. Other students lost their vacancies in favor of young students or transferred to 
night schooling. The night schooling attempted to be more inclusive but it did not work due to constant 
electricity cut in many capital cities. Some cities went two to four months without electricity. 
4 According to the Final Report on Household Survey published by the National Institute of Statistics, INE 
(2004). the average rate of illiteracy among adults nationwide is about 53.6%: it is higher in rural areas 
(65.7%) than in urban districts (30.3%) and more marked among women (68%) than men (37.7%). See also 
Mario and Nandja (2006). This household survey data is based on the period that the Afrobarometer survey 
was conducted in 2002. 











communist countries, the circulation of information was controlled by party-state 
agencIes. 
The Frelimo one-party system favored pro-government trade umons and business 
organizations. Indeed, it created a confederation of labor unions - Organizw;iio dos 
Trabalhadores M()(;ambicanos-Central Sindical (OTM-CS), which are still today aligned 
with the state. Business organizations in Mozambique were also strongly dominated by 
the state. In fact, 
"the bureaucratic elite which grew in the shadow of the Frelimo party-state are in the phase of re-
conversion and installation into the world of business and the nascent national business class. For 
this. their main capital is precisely their link with Frelimo and its state. It is people in this stratum 
- including. for instance, the amlY officers from the army struggle - who have benefited most 
from the privatization of companies and services that were once under state control as well as bank 
credits granted with no expectation of repayment, or at nominal interest rates" (Pereira and 
Shenga, 2005:56). 
On the other hand, church, or community development or self-help organizations were 
historically able to retain more independence from the state. 
The Frelimo party-state system also shaped the range of influential persons that citizens 
could contact to obtain help or communicate their concerns or needs. Besides the usual 
array of Frelimo party officials and officials of government ministry, traditional rulers, 
local councilors and other community influential persons have also been aligned to the 
state. Traditional rulers were described in Decree Number 15/2000, of June 20 as a 
continuation of the state bureaucracy at grass roots and community levels and assigned 
the task of collecting taxes. Frelimo local councilors have dominated all municipalities 
since they won the 1998 local elections. Other community influential persons, like those 
who are relatively wealthier, are also the bureaucratic elite which grew up in the shadow 
of Frelimo one-party system and is in the phase of re-conversation and installation in 
world of business and the nascent business class (Pereira and Shenga, 2005). Thus, few 











In this context, Mozambicans will not only tend to have low levels of information about 
politics, but they also should tend to get their information from state aligned sources. 
How much Mozambican's know about public affairs and politics as well as where they 
obtain their information is likely to shape how they understand democracy and their level 
of commitment to democracy. I distinguish between substantive understandings of 
democracy, which refcr to what dcmocracy docs or its concrete outcomes, and procedural 
understandings, which emphasize the rules and procedures of democracy (Bratton and 
van de Walle, 1997). The former "prescribes a specific content to policy" (Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) such as improving living standards or alleviation of 
poverty, whereas the later "is precisely about the struggle to determine those policies" 
(Diamond, 2005). How much Mozambican's know about politics and where they get that 
information may also shape the bases on which they support democracy - whether it is 
based on performance evaluations of political factors (like delivery of freedoms and 
political rights) or of economic factors (such as the availability of jobs opportunities and 
improvement of living standards). Thus, I am interested in exploring the extent to which 
individual levels and sources of information shape Mozambicans' understandings of 
democracy as well as their commitment to democracy, and also the bases of their 
commitment to democracy by using public opinion data. 
Hypotheses and Arguments 
I expect that the few Mozambicans with high levels of political information and who get 
their information from relatively independent sources will be more likely to understand 
democracy procedurally and also will be more likely to be committed to democracy, and 
will be more likely to base their commitment to democracy on political performance 
rather than economic performance factors. In contrast, the majority who have low levels 
of information and who acquire it from state aligned sources will be more likely to 












The reasoning behind my expectations is as follows: "Education is a catalyst of social 
change; formal schooling informs people about the way things work in the world; and it 
increases awareness of public affairs" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:204). It 
is through education that individuals learn the rules of how the society functions and 
receive knowledge to play out their role. It also helps them to navigate more easily in 
other cognitive arenas (Bertrand and Valois, 1994). For instance, acquiring and 
processing information from newspapers requires a degree of formal education. Mass 
media exposure enhances "civic consciousness" (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 
2002:vii); and "prompts policy discussion" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 
2005:219). Like education, media consumption is connected with cognitive skills. 
On the other hand, obtaining information from state aligned sources is not conducive to 
positive attitudes toward democracy since the quality of democracy in Mozambique is 
being subverted and constrained by those very Frelimo officials or elites who administer 
the state. While political reforms have led to some former autocracies being reclassified 
as 'liberal democracies' or at least 'electoral democracies', Mozambique's political 
regime is at best 'ambiguous' (see Diamond, 2002). Freedoms are limited and corruption 
is high (Transparency International, 2005; Freedom House, 2005). Electoral institutions, 
including the constitutional council, are infiltrated by and favor the dominant party, thus 
reducing the level of political competition. Due the adoption of a highly presidentialized 
system, the legislature cannot hold the executive accountable, with limited oversight and 
representation responsibilities. Thus, obtaining political information from the very state 
aligned sources that subvert democracy means, at best, that people fail to receive any 
positive message of the procedural elements of democracy and become less committed 
democrats. In addition, given the Marxist route of Frelimo, it is likely that they will 
transmit substantive views of democracy. 
Relying on the information they have from their formal education and greater uses of 
private mass media as well as the use of more independent or critical sources of 











the delivery of political rather than economic goods. They perceive that the basket of 
political goods has improved while inequality has increased. 
Indeed, though Mozambique has registed high levels of economic growth, since 1998, it 
has not been equally redistributed across the country. Macroeconomic improvements 
(like economic growth and controlled inflation) have not been reflected at the micro level 
(in terms of the improvements of individual living standards). On the other hand, 
Mozambicans now enjoy freedoms and political rights that were denied or limited under 
the old regime. 
Why is Popular Commitment to Democracy Important? 
Popular commitment to democracy (legitimation) is a multidimensional construct that 
combines the concepts of support for democracy and a broader rejection of authoritarian 
regimes. The popular legitimation of democracy is argued by many analysts to be the key 
to democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; 
Diamond, 1999). 
Linz and Stepan (1996) stress that consolidation occurs when all political actors come to 
regard democracy as "the only game in town", in other words, this means "democracy is 
consolidated when citizens and leaders alike conclude that no alternative form of regime 
has any greater subjective validity or stronger objective claim to their allegiance" 
(Bratton and Mattes, 2001 :447). 
By examining and understanding post-communist societies, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 
(1998) highlight that popular support is the foundation to maintaining a political regime. 
Without support no political regime can survive, maintain or consolidate (Diamond, 
1999). Similarly, Gunther, Montero and Torcal point out that "support for democracy 











functioning of a healthy democracy" (Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2004: 1; Gunther, 
Montero and Puhle, 2004). 
However, while Linz and Stepan (1996) measured commitment to democracy by 
'preference (support) for democracy against its alternatives'; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 
(1998) measured it by 'rejection of authoritarian regimes'. This study adopts both 
methods of measuring and explaining popular commitment to democracy, following 
Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) and Mattes and Shin (2005). 
The Likely Sources of Popular Commitment to Democracy 
Levels of information 
This explanation assumes that the amount of political and civic information that people 
possess matters for their attitudes to democracy. People with high levels of information -
based on access to formal education and, or exposure to news media - are expected to be 
more aware of public affairs and more supportive of democracy (Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). News media consumption is said to increase awareness of 
democracy, enhance a "civic consciousness" (Hyden, Leslie and Ogundimu, 2002), and 
"prompts policy discussion" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Exposure to 
mass media also becomes a decisive factor for democratisation by not only informing 
people about political events and public affairs, but also enabling them to become 
watchdogs of the democratic political process (Schmitt-Beck and Voltmer, 2004:2-4). 
However, this does not mean that citizens who lack education acccss and mcdia cxposurc 
necessarily lack the information to form attitudes toward democracy. Individuals not only 
acquire information through formal education and news media, but can also learn from 
others, where individuals add their personal experiences to that of others (Lupia and 












People may acquire political information and developing interest in public affairs from 
their interpersonal social networks, through the 'active discussion of politics with friends 
and neighbors, spouse and co-workers' (Richardson and Beck, 2004). Discussion of 
politics with family members, co-workers, and friends was found to be more influential 
than media (e.g. newspapers) by Lazarsfeld and coIleagues for two reasons: first, 
interpersonal networks have greater coverage and second, are based on high levels of 
trust among network members (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944; Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, McPhee, 1954). I discuss this set of psychological orientations under the label 
of "cognitive engagement" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). 
Sources of Information 
Some scholars argue that the specific informational environment in which people obtain 
their information has an important effect on political attitudes that can be conducive to 
democratic consolidation. Gunther, Montero and Torcal, for example, focus on the nature 
of information intermediation in a wide variety of democratic systems, and the 
implication of different patterns of intermediation for the nature of politics and the 
quality of democracy (Gunther, Montero and Torcal, 2004). Gunther, Montero and Torcal 
(2004) distinguish between informational intel111ediaries that are 'explicitly political' 
from those that are 'ostensibly apolitical and non-partisan'. 
However, I distinguish mainly between sources of information that are state aligned from 
those that are relatively more independent. I argue that obtaining infol111ation from 
sources that are state controlled or state aligned has a different impact on attitudes to 
democracy compared to obtaining it from sources that are more independent or non-state 
aligned. 
Nevertheless, the nature and extent of this impact from country to country depends on the 











away from democratization. If they are In the process of subverting the quality of 
democracy, people who contact them or are member of their organizations are more 
likely to get information that is detrimental to democracy.6 
Alternatively contacting influential persons that are far away from state control or are 
more independent is likely to create more positive attitudes to democracy. They are more 
likely to be critical about the conduct of government in office and more likely to demand 
shared power across state institutions, accountability, competition, rule of law, and easy 
access to participation in order to obtain their desired goals. 
Performance evaluations 
The performance evaluation explanation is based on a rational choice approach to 
individual political behavior. It assumes that political actors make rational decisions in 
situations of uncertainty. They "make choices within constraints to obtain their desired 
ends (self-interests)" (Levi, 1997:27). Individuals evaluate the performance of officials, 
regimes, governments and institutions on the basis of practical tests of how that 
performance affects personal and collective self-interests (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-
Boadi, 2005). 
Improving democratic performance is widely cited as a prerequisite for democratic 
(legitimation) consolidation. However, researchers differ by the relative emphasis they 
place on the importance of economic and political performance factors (Evans and 
Whitefield, 1995). 
(, Fung (2003) point out that associational life, for instance, can enhance democracy by fostering civic 
virtues and teaching political skills, offering resistance to power and checking government, improving the 
quality and equality of representation, facilitating public deliberation, and creating opportunities for 
citizens and groups to participate directly in governance. However, Fung point out that this contribution 
depends on the nature of associations and also on the political context of:1 given society. Some forms of 











Some scholars, the so-called 'first generation', highlight the effectiveness of government 
delivery of socio-economic goods as the key to the sustainability of democracy 
(Przerworski, 1991, Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; Pereira, Maraval & Przerworski, 1993; 
Przerworski et al., 1996), indicating that democratic regimes that do a better job handling 
the economy and improving people's living standards are more likely to endure 
(Przerworski et al., 1996). As such, the transition to democracy is a function ofthc degree 
to which economic experience departs from citizens expectations (Przerworski, 
1991:184). 
Elster (1993) argues that democracy will be undermined if it cannot deliver goods in 
economic sphere (Elster, 1993: 268). In the same line of thinking, Ake (1996) argues that 
Africans view democracy in economic and instrumental terms. Contending that "Africans 
are seeking democracy as a matter of survival" he posits that "the democratic movement 
in Africa will emphasize concrete economic and social rights rather than abstract political 
rights; it will insist on the democratisation of economic opportunities, the social 
betterment of people, and a strong social welfare system" (Ake, 1996: 239-44). 
On the other side, 'second generation' researchers emphasize "the ability of citizens to 
exercise basic political rights" (Bratton and Mattes, 2001:451) and "expectation(s) of 
public order, accountability, freedom, and constitutionalism" (Diamond, 1997) as the 
prerequisite to the durability of democracy. 
In fact, most empirical studies have found that popular support for democracy is largely 
based on political considerations rather than economic. As Diamond points out: "The 
most striking finding is the autonomy of the political", which overpowers "the country's 
level of socio economic development, the individual's socio economic status, and the 
regime's economic performance" (Diamond, 1999: 162). Similarly, Rose, Mishler and 
Haepfer contend that public opinion about various political regimes is shaped more by 
guarantees of basic political rights than by a track record of material delivery" (Rose, 
Mishler and Haepfer, 1998: 160). They find that while economic factors contribute to 











that both economic and political performance are important but the multiple effects 
suggests that the perceived political performance is of greater weight than is economic 
since it appears to have considerably stronger effects. 
The Scope and Design of this Study 
I test the effects of cognitive factors (levels and sources of information, cognitive 
engagement, and understandings of democracy) and performance evaluations on citizens' 
commitment to democracy. I use a micro-level analysis, and a cross-sectional design, 
which means "people of many ages, behaviours, and opinions are represented within the 
study population" (Lewis-Beck, Bryaman and Liao, 2004:299-230). In a cross-sectional 
design, the cases represented within the study population are measured at the same point 
of time (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995; de Vaus, 2001). 
A cross-sectional design allows "observation of phenomena in more natural, realistic 
setting, increasing the size and representativeness of the population studied, and allowing 
the testing of hypotheses that do not lend themselves to experimental manipulation. The 
"cross-sectional design sacrifices internal validity of results for improving in external 
validity" (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995: 134). 
I test my hypotheses against data collected through a public opinion sample survey. "If 
scientifically designed and administered in a culturally sensitive manner, sample surveys 
are a powerful tool" (Pereira, Davids and Mattes, 2002; Pereira et aI., 2003) for revealing 
attitudes that are conducive to democracy. This study is based on survey data from Round 
2 of the Afrobarometer. This survey interviewed a sample of 1400 Mozambicans that was 
a randomly selected representative sample of the adult Mozambican population between 
August and October 2002 in all 11 provinces of the Republic of Mozambique through 











Hypotheses' testing IS conducted through multiple linear regressIon analysis. The 
assumption underlying mUltiple regression analysis is that the dependent and independent 
variables must be continuous. If the independent variables are not continuous they must 
be recoded as dichotomous 'dummy' variables. Multiple regression statistical techniques 
allow us to test simultaneously the effects of people's cognition (levels and sources of 
inforn1ation, cognitive engagement, and understandings of democracy) and their 
perforn1ance evaluations on their commitment to democracy. 
The Outline of this Study 
In chapter 2, I consider the patterns of Mozambicans' understandings of and commitment 
to democracy. This chapter also tests the validity and reliability of the multidimensional 
constructs of commitment to democracy. While commitment to democracy is shallow in 
Mozambique, factor and reliability analyses confirm the validity and internal consistency 
of the items that measure the composite index labeled commitment to democracy. 
However, Mozambicans understand democracy as a set of procedures that 'allow 
everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions'. 
In Chapter 3, I explain Mozambicans understandings of and commitment to democracy 
by testing the effects of levels and sources of information. I hypothesize that the few 
Mozambicans with high levels of information and acquire their information from 
relatively more independent sources will more likely to understand democracy 
procedurally as well as will be more likely to be committed to democracy, while the 
majority who have low levels of information and obtain their information from state 
aligned sources will more likely to understand democracy substantively and less likely to 
be committed democrats. 
Generally speaking, the findings reveal optimism for this "informational" model even 
though some small deviations are found. The results reveals that people who have high 











sources are indeed more likely to understand democracy procedurally and are more likely 
to be committed to democracy than those who obtain their information from state aligned 
sources. However, by relying on informal sources of information, especially interpersonal 
discussion of politics, Mozambicans obtain some awareness of politics and form attitudes 
that matter for democratic consolidation. Also those who contact state aligned influential 
persons, particularly officials of government ministries still appear to be committed to 
democracy. 
In chapter 4, I examine the basis of Mozambicans commitment to democracy testing the 
impact of cognitive factors (levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement, and 
understandings of democracy). The results reveal that popular commitment to democracy 
is a result of both positive economic and political performance evaluations but politics 
matter more than economics. The results reconfirm that people who have high levels of 
information and acquire their information from relatively more independent sources are 
more likely to be committed to democracy. However, people who discuss politics with 
friend or neighbors are also more likely to be committed to democracy. Procedural 
understandings of democracy appear to be a more important determinant of popular 
commitment to democracy compared to substantive understandings. The results also 
suggest that the process of being committed to democracy is collective learning 
experience through country institutional legacies. 
In Chapter 5, I briefly restate the conclusions of the chapters, discuss the findings, and 
draw the theoretical and political implications of the findings and provide strategies to 












Attitudes toward Democracy in Mozambique: 
Commitment to and Understandings of Democracy 
The first step in analyzing survey data is to examine single variables - i.e. univariate 
analysis. This statistical technique shows how many survey respondents fall into the 
response categories of each of the variables (Denver, 1994). This chapter introduces and 
provides descriptive features of Mozambicans' understandings of democracy and their 
levels of commitment to democracy. What are the Mozambicans levels of commitment to 
democracy? How do Mozambicans regard, view or understand democracy: are they more 
likely to understand democracy procedurally or substantively? 
2.1. Commitment to Democracy 
Popular commitment to democracy (or legitimation) is a multidimensional construct that 
combines the constituent concepts of popular support for democracy and a broader 
rejection of authoritarian regimes. Committed democrats are those people who 
simultaneously support democracy (i.e. say 'democracy is preferable to any other kind of 
government') and strongly reject any type of authoritarian regimes, like one-party, 
military, and one-man rule (see Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Mattes and 
Shin, 2005). 
To describe the patterns of Mozambicans levels of commitment to democracy I examine 












Support for d,'mo .. :racy 
Support for dcmocracy is a popular prefcrcncc for democratic political regime again't it, 
altcrnativcs. Pcople who support democracy S3Y they prekr 1t to any other kind or 
govcrnment. Figure 2, I ,ummarizes the re,ults 01' a 2002 rarxit,m represen tative ,ample 
or III ye3r<; and older Mozambican population. Tbe result, show a llKX1erate !e"el of 
popular ,upport ror democracy among ~lozamhicans . Just ("'cr one half (54 percent) 
resp(mdellt, say thm democracy is preferable to any other kind of govcrnmcnt, 
Figure 2.1; Support for democracy 
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QU"51IOn ' "Wh,Ch of Ihe follm\'lJ'f ,Ialemcnl, " d,",e>l 10 your '>pmion" A) Den.><:rac), is 
preferable '0 .ny olh"r Lmd "f "",'emIl"'''': U) In ,0Ill<.' ciTt'ulll.,lance,. a non-tkmocT3Ii, 
gonrnmeno can be pref ... ohle: and C) to. SOmt"ne lih me 11 doe' !>ot m'[[er "hoc fo{m of 
go\"t'rnmcn' "" how'· 
In compari"lI1 to results or Round 2 Afroharometer surveys conducted in 16 countfles 
hdween 2002 alld 20m.' Mozamb'can, ,uPP'Jrt fi)r democracy is about 10 percentage 
l)(lInts lower thall the 10 country average (64 percent). Am<Mlg 16 Afroharometer 
countrie'ln Round 2. Kcny3 prescllt tl~ h'gh"'t (80 percellt) level 1<)lIo\\'ed by SCllegal 
(75 perccnt), Lganda (75 perccnt), Mali (71 perccnt), Zambia (70 pacent) , Nigcria (07 
percent). Botswana (66 percent), Tanzama and Cape Verdc (05 pcrcent). Malawi (64 
percent) and South Africa (57 percellt), ,A.lld then tallows Mozambiquc and .'Jamlbia, 











botb witb 54 percent of popular support lor dcmocracy, The lowcst inc! of popular 
s"pport for dem(x; r;,cy in Round 2 of the A frobilromel~r ,,,, rvey comes from 7.i",babwc 




























I aho ex~minc the pmterns of reject ion of other regimes thm have ken expcrimcntcd 
wllhin the ,African contexl. C'p<!cia lly allthoritari~n ones, Rcjection of ~uthorit~ri~n 
regimes refcrs to " popul;]J" djs ilpprov~1 of three types of all thoritarian regimcs, nmncly: 
one-parly, onc-man, and 'lllillary ru le. \\'h;'1 ,,,e the l ~vels ofI\107i1lnbiciln,' rejectIOn of 
Ihosc thrce fonn <; of authO rll~ri"n regime,? 
Figure 2.3 show till.' dist rib lltlOns of respon(knts in categories of rejec tions of the three 
j( lrmS of ~uthoritan~n regimes, The result, ,how thaT Jll<;l Ie" than half (47 p<:rcent ilnd 
46 percent) of all rcspondents, rcspe('ti vc Iy, r~jcct one-party rule and onc-man rule. 
Ho\\~yer, mllitilf',' go\'ellllllenl ;'pp<,ars to k rejected nt , lightly higher levels. More th~n 










"Ikr 16 ye~rs of c:<'p.I!l'icnec of the long and d~,lIllCliv~ ,Ivil w~r Moz~mbicans Me less 
likely 10 tolerm~ the army coming in Ln g()vnn the country, than u rc"ersul to olll'-party 
rule 01' 'stron~ man' rule 










Q",,;.rion: "There art mllny "'"Y' of goycmll1g a cm","}'_ Would Y"I! rejoel oc "Ppro" of Iho 
following "lt~rJlat i,";'! Only ooe pllrty i, ,!lowed 10 "01><1 for 010cl10" ,n,j h<1ld o/fico (~nO-pl\lly 
"-'''I: lh" army ,')[n," m 10 gmcm the counlry (mili',,), rukJ : "od elwion, ",,u lb. naLional 
a"mobly lIr<: aDoli,I,.,1 so LO" the prc,idml con dooid< oWlythi"g (ooe-omo nlkY 
These Inds ()I- rCjc-c ll(ln ()I- ~uthorit~ri~1l r~gilllcs in \lozamblljuc mc lJl~ lowe,l in 
Africa," While MOYA1111biquc: ~nd N~lllibi~ huve the lowc,l proporti()ns "I- disapprO\al or 
onc-purly, OnC-man and military rllk 7.~mbi~ ~nd K~nya have the hlghcst levels 
Lambians !cud lk way in rejcding mil iwry rule; Ugandans share the lead in rtjcctillg 
one-man nile anu Nlgenans are mo~l dl SlllJSsiv~ of one-pany rule (see figures 2.4. 1, 
2.4,2 and 2.4.3). 
111 gener~l, th~ avcrage proportions or thc:,e C()nsidn~t l ons in Africu indicatc tlw t lmge 
lllujorilics of A flie ans I'ejccl the aull~ lr i larran rc:gimes, Indced, the avcragc of disapPI'O\'al 
"j" mllitury rule is 78 percent unlong Africans, while "j" olle-m~n Jlld olle-p~l1y rule is 











ThlS low level of popubr commitmcnt to democr,lcy (e,g, 'uppml I()r dcmocracy and 
r~j~ctlon of aUlhoriwrian r~gime» in Mozambique reflects low levels 01- elite 
,'ommitm<.:m to democf,KY, While l\-lo7ambi'-!lLc's po litic-al elite agreed on the rules for 
,'omptlting for pmver. they h,l'ie nOI )'d agr.:cd on ways to enforce limils on ,(ate 
authori ty ,\11 ckctoral institutions. inciU{hng thc com,titutional council. are controlled by 
the ful ing party r.:dllCl ng the scope of po l i tic~ 1 ~ol11p"tition and participation, 'I he entire 
stak authonly re,t on tk prcsident ",ho is both head ol-,tale and of sovcrnmcnt and the 
parliament cann(~ hold the head of so'-emmcnt a,'~ountahle 'incc thc constitution allow 
him to delcgat<.: th, premier whenever he w,mh, 
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Following rrt\'iou, >;Iudic>; of [Xlpular commitment to democracy in Africa (B ratton , 
Mattes and Gyimuh-Boadi, 2005: ,-lattes and Shm. 2(05), J have defined commitmentlo 











rejection of authoritarianism. However, to make sure that this construct is both valid and 
reliable I tested it statistically using factor and reliability analyses.9 Factor analysis 
confirms validity, and the reliability analysis confirms internal consistency, that 
Mozambicans' preference of democracy is strongly related to their rejection of three 
forms of authoritarian regimes. In other words, we can confidently say that committed 
democrats are those Mozambicans who say democracy is preferable to any other form of 
government, and who strongly reject one-party, military and one-man governments. A 
single unrotated factor was extracted with an eigenvalue greater that one (1.521) which 
explains 51 percent of the common variance. The index reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) is 
(.65) acceptable. Thus, instead of using popular support for democracy and rejection of 
the three forms of authoritarian regimes as they were separate attitudes I employ its 
composite index in further analyses as my main dependent variable. 
Table 2.1: Commitment to democracy (index) 
Reject military rule 
Reject one-man rule 
Reject one-party rule 






Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.521, and common variance of 51 
percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha =.65. Number of cases (n= 1385). 
2.2. Procedural versus Substantive Understandings of Democracy 
Understandings of democracy refer to the ways that individual vIews or regard 
democracy. We distinguish between procedural and substantive understandings of 
democracy. Substantive understandings of democracy refer to what democracy does in 
terms of concrete outcomes. It "subscribes a specific content to policy" (Bratton, Mattes 
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005), like improvement of people living standards or alleviation of 
9 It is to be seen here that committed democrats are only those who strongly reject authoritarian regime. 
Those who simply reject are partially committed democrats. As such, they are not coded with highest value 











poverty. Procedural understandings are "precisely about the struggle to determine those 
policies" (Diamond, 2005). They emphasize "political process for arriving at decisions" 
and "includes guarantees of civil rights and rules for elections, under which uncertain 
police outcomes arise from interplay of contending political forces" (Bratton, Mattes and 
Gyimah-Boadi, 2005:69). In short, it refers to what democracy is or 'as an end in itself 
rather than what it does. 
Is democracy understood procedurally or substantively in Mozambique? The measure 
used in this study differs from the one presented in Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi 
(2005). While Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) measure understandings of 
democracy by an open-ended question: "What, if anything, does 'democracy' mean to 
you?" encouraging so respondents to answer in their own words, through a scale of 8 
items: 4 procedural and 4 substantive, using Round 1 of the Afrobarometer data, I use 
Round 2 of the Afrobarometer one, which ask about this issue in a very different 
manner. 10 
Round 2 of the Afrobarometer ask a question that provides respondents with two 
statements: (1) 'democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal 
voice in making decisions'; or (2) 'democracy is only worth having if it can address 
everyone's basics needs'. 
The evidence 111 Table 2.5 shows that most (61 percent) Mozambicans understand 
democracy as a set of procedures for arriving at decisions (i.e. 'democracy is worth 
having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions'). Just 
under one-fifth (21 percent) of Mozambicans view it substantively (i.e. 'democracy is 
only worth having if it can address everyone's basic needs'). Yet while 32 percent of 
Frelimo identifies can understand democracy procedurally, 31 percent of independent 
citizens (those who identify with no political party) and even lower 23 percent of 
opposition identifies do so. 
10 While my procedural measure only taps the aspect of 'equal and free voice in making decisions', Bratton, 
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That Mozambicans understand democracy as 'an end in itself might reflects the role 
played by the enormous information network of voter education campaigns mainly in the 
1994 founding elections involving "almost all the country broadcasting, video and 
advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young 
Mozambicans" (de Maia, 1996). Though the aim of this campaign was "to mobilize the 
public, first to register as voters, and then for the actual voting itself' (de Maia, 
1996: 151), the voter education agents first had to explain the meaning of the concept of 
democracy, that is, what democracy is. This may also reflect the long history of conflict 
and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of conflict resolution. 
Supporting this, for instance, are countries that experienced long conflict's periods and 
violence, like Nigeria, Namibia and Uganda, and are also quite higher procedural (see 
Figure 2.6). 
Summary of Findings 
In this chapter, I examined the patterns of Mozambicans' understandings of and support 
for democracy and rejection of authoritarian regimes. I also tested the validity and 
reliability of the construct of commitment to democracy, which is a multidimensional 
version that combines the concepts of support for democracy and rejection of one-party, 
military, and one-man authoritarian rule. 
The results revealed that the levels of Mozambicans' commitment to democracy are not 
deep. Just a simple majority (54 percent) of Mozambicans support democracy and less 
than half strongly reject or reject one-man (46 percent) and one-party rule (47 percent). 
Just over half (56 percent) of them strongly reject or reject military rule. Compared to 
other African countries these levels of popular commitment to democracy in 











Factor and reliability analyses of attitudes toward popular support for democracy and 
rejection of the three forms of authoritarian regimes found that those concepts represent a 
larger valid and reliable single multi dimension labeled commitment to democracy. It 
confirms that committed democrats are those Mozambicans who prefer democracy 
against its alternatives and strongly reject the three forms of authoritarian regimes. 
Conversely to their levels of commitment to democracy, Mozambicans' procedural 
understanding of democracy is relatively high. We observed that most (61 percent) 
Mozambicans understand democracy procedurally, meaning that 'democracy is worth 
having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions'. I 
suggested that this may reflect the role played by the enormous information network in 
voter education campaigns in the founding multiparty elections in explaining the positive 
meaning of the concept of democracy. This also may reflect the long history of conflict 
and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of conflict resolution. 
Instead of simply describing the features of these attitudes toward Mozambicans 
understandings of and commitment to democracy I am also interested in explaining them. 
This is the goal of the chapters that follow where I will test and examine the effects of 
levels and sources of information considerations on Mozambicans understandings of and 












The Effects of Levels and Sources of Information on Mozambicans' 
Understandings of and Commitment to Democracy 
In this chapter, I begin by examining features of Mozambicans' levels and sources of 
information. I then statistically model two attitudes to democracy -- understandings of 
and commitment to democracy -- by testing and examining the effects of levels and 
sources of information factors against each other. I argue that if government officials are 
in the process of subverting the quality of democracy, as in Mozambique, then those 
people who contact them, or are affiliated in their organizations, or who identify with 
their political party, will be less likely to possess positive attitudes to democracy because 
the information that they acquire from those intermediaries will be more likely to be 
detrimental to, or help to breakdown, democracy. 
Alternatively people who contact relatively more independent influential persons, 
identify with opposition parties or who are independent of parties influence or become a 
member of relatively more independent organizations, will be more likely to understand 
democracy procedurally rather than substantively and be committed to democracy. The 
messages that pass through these information intermediaries will be more supportive of 
democratic consolidation because these organizations will be more likely to demand 
greater political freedom, accountability, clean and decent government, rule of law and 
constitutionalism, and respect for democratic procedures. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 examines data on levels of information 
(formal education and news media use) and cognitive engagement (interpersonal 
discussion of politics and interest in public affairs). It then explores their bivariate 
connections with popular understandings of and commitment to democracy, as a first test 










Section 3.2 examines the data on sources of information. I examine first state aligned 
sources of il~rormation, such as identification with the ruling party, contacting officials, 
local councilors, traditional rulers and other community influential persons, like someone 
who is relatively wealthier, and membership in trade unions and professional 
associations. Second, I then examine independent sources of information, such as 
membership in religious and community development groups, contacting religious 
leaders, participation in collective action and identification with opposition parties. I then 
explore their bivariate relationships with those two popular attitudes to democracy. 
Finally, section 3.3 tests and exammes the joint impacts of levels and sources of 
information, and cognitive engagement factors on public understandings of and 
commitment to democracy, using multivariate analyses. The last Section then 
summarizes the chapter findings. 
3.1. Levels of Information 
Formal education 
In Chapter 1, I outlined several aspects of Mozambique's history (namely the Portuguese 
colonial experience and the 16 years of civil war) that have conspired to leave the country 
in a very bad situation with regard to formal education. 
Since then international donors, especially the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, have been supporting the reconstruction of the country's schooling 
infrastructure, arguing that formal education was essential for the sustainability of 
democracy and the economy. The country's political parties have also emphasized formal 
education in their electoral manifestos as key instruments to preserve national unity and 
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Figu re 3.2: [.enls of formal education i tl 16 Afroharometer cou ntries 
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To whm cxtelll docs formal ed\lc~tion contrihutc to understanding democracy 
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education are for more likely to be committed democrats compared to those with no 
formal education. 
Mass media consumption 
Since Mozambique embraced multi-party politics in 1994, the winds of change have 
increased mass media pluralism to the extent that the country now enjoys several private 
or independent daily and weekly newspapers, FM radio stations, and to a lesser extent 
television stations. Data from the state Information Office (Gabinete de Infarmar;iia ~ 
GABJNFO) collected by Macuane (2006) show significant increases of radio and 
television stations registrations in the late 1990s with the entrance of independent 
televisions (including RTK (now TVK), Miramar Television, Portuguese Radio-
Television for (Lusophone) Africa (RTPA/i'ica), Soico Television (STV), and 9TV). It 
should be noted that all these television stations also have their own radio stations. 
With regard to print media, the Information Office registered 178 publications (Macuane, 
2006: 135) in 2005. Among them, 42 have significant levels of circulation, including the 
state owned daily newspapers Diario de Moc,'ambique and Noticias, and the weekly 
newspaper Domingo and monthly magazine Tempo. It also includes the private or 
independent newspapers, such as internet or fax diaries Mediafax, Vertical, Correia da 
Manhii, Jmparcial, Diario de Noticias, Canal de Mor;ambique, etc; and the weekly 
Savana, Zambeze, Demos, Embondeira, 0 Pais, etc. 
But how many people have access to, or use this newly diversified range of media news 
outlets? In order to answer this, Afrobarometer asked Mozambicans: "How often do you 
get news from radio, television, and newspapers?" 
An overwhelming majority (76 percent) of respondents said that they get news from radio 
on a regular basis,13 with more than half (58 percent) getting news 'everyday' (Figure 











3.2}. These findings arc consistent with Juarcz de Maia who pointed out that the 
hroad~~sts of Radio 'v1oz~mhi 'lue and the uc- ti " ,tic, of the 'via" r:ormnum~~tion In, titute 
(lCS) coyer between iO to 80 per~ent of the ~ountry (de l\bia, 1996: 155). 
J\owe\·cr, only two in ten Mozambican, ::;ct TlCWS from television (26 po;rcent) or 
newspapers (20 perccnt), on a rq'!lllar basis. 
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Jjreaking down the»: data hy nosi(\."ntlal location. we find that l\bputo ~ lty residents arc 
l11uch mono likely to obtain new, from tdcvision, newsp~pcr' ~nd radio than ~ll other 
provinc-es. In addition, urh~n residents ~re more ilkc1y to get TlCws from television, 
newsp~p'''rs and ~ l>(, rad io than rural ones. lJrhan and rural re,pondcnts diner in 29 
percent points in getting news from newspaj:Crs, 45 j:Crc~nt points in g~tting news from 
t~le\'ision, aT1(i j i perctn t points in getting new's Ii'om radlO, on a regular ha,i, (set 
,Appendix Fl. This sugg~sts that while radiobroud~asts ar~ to some extent spn;ad ~~ro" 
Ihe ent ire country, tele\'is ion and TlCw'puper, al\: mOl\: mnc-entrated in Maputo capital 
city leaving two-thirds oflhe cOLLnt lY, which is rural. and to lesser extent some provinces 
without access to the~ sources of cognitivc awareness. This situation also reflccts thc 
faCllh a! l110st of Mozambicans jiYe below thc poverty line, so thcy may not be ~blc to 











When ~omp~red to the rest of the Afrob~rome!er Round 2 surwy, Moumbicans' levels 
of regular use to news from radio lag behind 15 percentage points to lhe 16 
Atl'obaromder country average (9 1 percclll), and a rcgular u,c of lclcvi,ion and 
new'paper new,;. re,;peLlivdy,,, 24 percenlage and 33 percentage points below the 16 
Alj-ob~rom~!er nlUntry ~v~wg~ (55 percent and 56 percTn!), 
Figure 3.4: ,\ wrage of lIledia l'llllsulIlption in 16 Afrobarometer co untries 
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Testing the c'Drrcial](ln bdween c'ol""ming fl~\"S media and atliludcs 10 democrJcy, the 
eviden~e shows nrsl a,; w,lh lormal education that ncws media consumption is not 
connccled with understandings of democracy (Pearson', r=. ,DOS), un unexpected finding_ 
14 A single unw,"(ed fa"",,· "as e.""acled "'''h <igell'-all", ~r.al.r t\l," one (1 ,65~), 66 rerco", of common 
expl"incd v,ri,,,c'o ,nd roli,hk" 7,1, numher or '-'"'" \n- I '199) 1 he hrlJ de'"," or ,he," and ,,(her 1;\Cluc 










However. th~y als.o show that thcr~ is'l very stroog rd<lllOnship bctv.c~n news media usc 
imd public commitmelllto dcmocraey (Pcarson 's r-.346 U ). 
Cognith'c cl1g~gcmcnj 
Regardless of whetocr /l,lozambieans have acccss to formal educatioll or make use of 
IlCWS media. I look at other altcrnative sourccs wocrc people call acquire information 
Ilccessary for democratic citizenship. Are Mozambicans intcrcsted in public affairs and 
do thcy actively disclL~s politiL'S" 
Figurc 3.5: !tllen'st il\ Publie Affll irs 
'" I -," t-'" .---c=,.=c-----
, 
Thc evidcnce in Figurc 3.5 demollstrates that most Mozambicans arc intcrcst~d in public 
ariairs, tholLgh relallvely fe\\ discu,s politics with fricnds 01' neighbors. \lorc than two-
thirds (72 perccnl) of \1ozambicans say they arc intcrcst~d m public affair';, wi1h 35 
pcrcent saying vcry intcrcsted. AlmoS1 threc in tcn (2g perccnt) 'v1ozambicalls rcspolldcd 
that tocy wcrc Ilot intcrested in public affmr". 
Compared to other Africiln". Figure _l~ "hows lhal .\fozarnblcan'" levcls of intercst in 











Africans (73 percent) and Zllnhahwe;lrI~ (73 percent). The,~ lew\, fall ,hghtly bt: low th~ 
AJ"roharomdn country av~rag~ (80 p~rc~nt). WhJ!~ BJ,othos (92 percent), Ugandeans 
(86 p<:rc~nt) Jnd BJlswana (~4 percent). and to some extent other Africans are more 
likely to l><: interested in public affairs, ]I,-Iala\\jans are less likely to do so {3R percentl. 





















Beyond Jonnal educalion and new, media usc, rclevant political informatlOn passes abo 
lhrough other altemal ive ,oc ial contexts, such as interpersonal di scussion of politics. Yet 
"hile 72 percent say they are interested in public affair', just 40 percent say they 
discussed politics with friend, or neighbors in the prevlOUS tweh e months. While ~'l 
percent ;,ay never discllssed politics. t\\ 0 in ten (23 pcr~ent) ~ay they 'would do it if hild a 


























QU","D": "PIc"", Idl wIKlh<r yOU pcr .. oo.lly ha," dl>cu". d poliTico with fri<M' Dr "<i\:hl""" 
dUTi,,\: th < pa,' ye," II n(lf, would yo" 00 thi, if yo" h"d the (han«"" 
In ~omparison to rest of the results from ROll nd 2 Afroo,l[(mwter , urv~y' mndu~ted in 10 
countries, 'vlozamhieans lag wcll lxhllld the 16·cOllntl)' ,Iver"ge (61 per~ent), in lwns of 
interpersoL1al Jis~ussion of politic s, Mozambic:ms "r~ les, likdy to engage m 
mlerpersonal d'SCIE<sion than other Afric,ms, WhJ!~ Klg~n,m' (75 per~ent ) are more 
lLkcly (0 di scuss poliTics with fricn ds or nClghhor" S~neg,llese are nlOre lLkcly lo engage 
In interpersonal discussion 'ol1<:n' (32 per~ent), 
Figu r{' J,~: I tH {'rpersoual dhcussion of pol;1 ie, in 1 6 '" froha romctcr rHU nlries 


























To what extent is cognitive engagement (discussion of politics and interest in public 
affairs) associated with democracy?15 From bivariate correlations, I confirm that both 
interest in public affairs (Pearson's r=.078**) and interpersonal discussion of politics 
(Pearson's r=.056*) are connected to how people understand democracy. At this stage, I 
observe that Mozambicans who discuss politics and interest in public affairs are more 
likely to understand democracy procedurally. I find that Mozambicans who discuss 
politics (Person's r=.263**) and those who are interested in public affairs (Person's 
r=.080**) are also more likely to be committed to democracy. 
3.2. Sources of Information 
Beyond how much information and interest people possess, I also want to know about the 
sources of their information and their impacts on attitudes to democracy. As explained in 
chapter 1, I distinguish between state aligned sources (?f information (including 
membership in state aligned organizations and identification with the governing party. It 
also includes contacting state aligned influential persons or leaders) and independent 
sources C?f h?formation (including membership in relatively more independent groups, 
participation in collective action, as well as contacting relatively more independent 
leaders, and identification with opposition parties). 
I, There is insufficient internal consistency between these two variables to combine them in a single 
construct, labeled cognitive engagement. In fact, variables measuring interest in public affairs and 












Con lacl i ng ,late aligned, er,u, m ore ind epen denl in n oen Ii" I persons 
Sln~~ th~ l'l'l{l denwcr,nic constitutional provl~ ion . /l.ioz'lll1bi"lO citizens may take the 
initiative 10 contacl Influential persons or leaders for iX!ip to solv.:: a prohlem or 10 \oic.:: 
their views. Thus, Afrobaromcter asked Mozambicans: 'During th.:: past ycar, how olkn 
have you c()ntactcJ rcb"iolLs leadcr~, traJitional rulers, ol'licials 01' gO\~J\lmcn t 
mlllistries, local roundlor, anJ olher commllnity inlllLcnlial pcr~on~ lilt help to solve .1 
prohlem ()r I() givc th~m your "lews?' 
The result~ in Figure 3.4 ~how thill "/l. i(l/"mbican~ arc 1101 ll~ce~sarily in the llilbit of 
using ol"Jic'ial ~hannds 10 r~ drc,.~ gn~van~c~ or addrc~~ public probleln~" (P~n:ira et a!., 
20{)3). They arc morc likc ly 10 lak, Iheir prohlems or VOICe I h~ir \i~w~ to n:ligIOU~ 
kadel'S, traditional rlLlers, and to <;()mc ex lent olhcr community innlLcnllal pt:lC;ons rather 
than 10 address lhem 10 olli~lab rdalcd \0 statC, cspcci,lIly ofli"i.iI~ 01' gO\~J\lm~nt 
ministries and local counclior,. 
Four illt~n (35 percent) and thrce in ten (34 percent). re<,pectivcly, say thcy imJ COnlaC\cJ 
a Ir'lditioll.iI ruler or religious leader, while only 13 p,'rcelll and <,I percent, respect ively, 
h'IJ c'onlacl~d a ic"'11 councilor or gOVCl1lll1~l1t ministry offici.li. The proportion of 
~onlac'lll1g otl-..:r community 1l111uential pt:lC;on~ filils in between the fonner .md the latter 
( I'l percent). 
Figure -',9: COlllading stale aligned "crsu~ lllon' imlrpt'ndclll illtlucntiall)H~On 
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[ ilncrpn::l thocse V~nJllCes in (''''lIacI with k~(t..:r;; by lhf d,<.lanCe., \1\,11 s.::pm1l1e 
'e>l",m\~m~ from the specific pe l¥.~l ~. Olliciah of govermnent milli,,,,~< arc far away 
ir...\ll\ Ihe majority of ordinary M07.1lmhlcans. based at the cell1ra ' l ev~ ' . "h~r~a~ 
lraditi<.>n;'] nllers ;'r~ ">ca!~d at the conHl1I lIlity Ulki "'TU"'; rOol I~vck Religiolls le~der< ilrt 
a ISQ very ~<..,<:es~i b[ e Jl community kvds. 
As s.1111e as oIher Arne.ms. t\[N:1mbie:1ns :lfe sti li r. . r ~\\'a) rrull1 .. njoymg lhe dcmocra1lc 
\1I"1 UCS ofpohlie~1 panicipalion lhfl1u¢1 Conl:1l1mg jll fl Uelll i~1 person.~ IU a.t\"llIlCC tOClr 
dc~ircd n.."'t'ds. :'I1<..z,lmhic.ms· l~\~h (>fC'»113clmg lll tl llcn lial p<'fflon~ ;"e wld .. r half31111 
abl' llt the same as the lG'-<:"l tntry ,,,·c rag~~. Ho" c,·cr. in. terms (I f , ,,,,tact<llS rehgl<J"" 
I~ndcrs. :'Ilozambi,;llls (34 p"rr~ llI ) lag rc lRU\"cJy be hi[}<i the Ai;-nban;tnI<!ICl co"ntry 
a'wnG~ (4i percent). 
Fi::urt ~. I I.J : C(lm ~,"Ii nl! ;'1 J 6 \ f rnlJ ~ r"m~h'r ruuntrin (awn :;:c) 
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,\~ I Msued earhe r In ch.11J1er I. ... ffkmls u r g,,,,~mmcnt mu,iMTlC"S. lrad lilollal ruleI'<. 
loca l cOUI! d lor5 ;'ml o\ ~n cnmnlllni l ~' Int1 "cnh~1 jlersol" an: Slale ahj,!ned.'· "hil~ 
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religious leaders are relatively more independent. What are the effects of contacting these 
different types of leaders on attitudes to democracy? 
If state aligned influential persons subvert and constrain democratic procedures and the 
quality of democracy, Mozambicans who contact them should be less likely to receive 
positive signals about democracy. The same logic is applied to membership in state 
aligned organizations as well as identification with the ruling party. 
As an initial test of these hypotheses, the bivariate correlation results show that 
contacting local councilors is not connected with either understandings of democracy 
(Pearson's r=.016) or commitment to democracy (Pearson's r=.002). There is also no 
relationship between contacting other community influential persons and understandings 
of democracy (Pearson's r=-.028) and commitment to democracy (Pearson's r=.010). 
Contacting traditional rulers have also statistically insignificant effect on people 
understandings of democracy (Pearson's r=-.018) and has a significant negative effect on 
commitment to democracy (Pearson's r=-.111 **), indicating confirmation that 
Mozambicans who contact traditional rulers are less likely to be committed to 
democracy. 
Public understandings of democracy are also not associated with contacting government 
officials (Pearson's r=.017) or religious leaders (Pearson's r=-.002). However, there is 
relationship between contacting government officials or religious leaders and 
commitment to democracy. Those who contacted government officials (Pearson's 
r=.132**) or to lesser extent religious leaders (Pearson's r=.072**) are more likely to be 
committed democrats. 
than one (1.099) which explain 45.349 percent of common variance but is not reliable. Reliability (Alpha) 
=.59. Factor loadings: traditional ruler (.595), some other influential persons (.566), local councilors (.490), 











I denti fic~t i o n "ith the ruli ng party versus with OllPosi tion parties 
As usual. the ruling party tends to be morc conservative while the political opposition 
tends!O be more liberal. For instance, a, a Democrat candidate, Bill Clinton campaigned 
democrat (liberal). hut go\'erned ~onsenalive. A, ;;uch, politll'al part ie, may transmIt 
liberal or l'onserl'ativ~ values or infomlation to lilOse people who belong or identIfy to 
them. Do ,~lozalllbican> id~ntify with political panics? And to what extent (k1CS the ir 
pani>anship affect their follower,' paltlcuiar views ahout demOcral')'? Afroharometer 
asked !>.10z.11llbicans: 'Do you leel close to any political party? lfye>, which pany'." 
Thc result, in Figurc 3.1 I ,uggcst lhat most (Sg percent) Mozambicans identify with the 
ruling party hclimo. Threc in ten (35 perccnt) rc>pondents are indcpen<knt not 
"kmlfving with any political party. Just 6 pcrcent iJcmify with oppo>ition parties. 
including Rcnamo, Pimo. PCl\, Sol and others. 
As usual. idemi ficallon wl th thc nil ing party rcflects a state al igncd source of ill founati on 
while "lcntdicalion Wilh lh" political opposition rcpresents a relatively more IIld'-'f1Cndent 
sourcc of information. 




















Analyzing the effects of identification with the ruling party and political opposition, the 
results show that there is no relationship between partisan identification and 
understandings of democracy.17 Nonetheless, partisan identification matter for popular 
commitment to democracy. People who identify with opposition parties (Pearson's 
r=.107**) and to lesser extent identify with the ruling party (Pearson's r=.067*) are more 
likely to be committed to democracy than those who do not feel close to any party. 
Membership in state aligned versus in independent groups 
Moving to other informational environments where people may obtain information about 
public affairs, I examine associational life in state aligned organizations, especially trade 
unions or farm associations and professional or business associations, and in relatively 
more independent organizations, particularly religious groups and community 
development or self help associations. 
Associational life is a key element of the process of democratization, "creating not only 
private goods for those who belong to them, but also public goods for the entire society 
by developing organizational and advocacy skills, creating a form to discussing public 
affairs and acting as watchdog over elected leaders" (Pereira et aI., 2003:8). 
With the exception of membership in religious groups, I observe that "Mozambicans 
have not yet appeared to have taken advantage of the freedom of association to create or 
join civic associations in large numbers" (Pereira et aI., 2003). While close to two-thirds 
(66 percent) belong to a religious group, with four in ten (44 percent) saying that they are 
an official leader or an active member, only two in ten (18 percent) are members of a 
trade union or farm association, and just one in ten (10 percent) are a member of a 
17 The Pearson's correlation between identification with the ruling party and understandings of democracy 











profc:.sional or bu:.ine:'8 a8sociatioll, and .1 commumty de\'elupment or ,elf help 
organization (sce Figure 3. 12). 
Does group m~mhershlp 1!\ Siale ohgned or relali vely mOrC inJcpcmk YlI org3niz3tioYl s 
affcct8 attitlldes to democracy in Mozamblqlle?I'; 















Q,,,,,""'" Now t am yomg \0 feod olll 0 11<1 of g"~lp ' thot people Joi" 00" _1tteoo roc each ""e. 
could you tell m<.' wbetber Y"" _,,., an oiliei,1 ic,dcr, '1] ae11\'O member. an mael],.., member, or I~" 
a member? 
The re8ulIs ,how li rsl lhot memhershlp m Slale uhgned organizallUnS lcnds 10 muke 
people 10 8e~ dem(x:rJeY nul pr(lCcdurally_ AITili31 ions In stale uligncJ or limn 
aS8(lCiUllun, (Pear:.on':. r=-,070*') und In prufes:'l(lllal Or husiness urganizalluns 
(Pearson's r- . {)6()~) hu\e slu li sti eolly 81gnlfi cUYlI corrcbliQns. bUI ure lIcgoli vcly 
aS8(lCiuled with pr(ll'edurul undcrslarnilllgs of demo<:raey, u:. expeLled_ Turning tu pupu lar 
commltment to dem(x:r~ey, thc rCSlll1s ,l1uw Ihut \\·hi le membersh ip in professionul or 
I~ I tri ed to c"mhine _,,,d »rOllp '-!"tistJcolly th e .. atTitudes to jon" larger <onW",,!> bllt there i, no illte-rn"l 
eon""e,,,'}' t" __ IV>een tbem. Ilxleed, vmiable, me",uril1g memlx-"hip 11l "a<k unio", or limn o''''''-'ia''''''' 
"xl in pn>fc"ion_, t Of t-;.L<Hle" '"pn;,"' i"" correlate with eoeh "th,', at r- .279" wah ,eli_1~ltity 
Alpha" .42\1') (n- 13~6). Vana~lc, mco'l!Tl"g mernbe"hip il] reIJgi()(l' ~''-'.Lp and community or ,elf he lp 











business organizations are not connected with commitment to democracy 
(Pearson' s=.O 12), membership in trade unions or farm associations is statistically 
significant and negatively associated with commitment to democracy (Peason's=-.06S*), 
confirming that those who belong to trade unions or farm associations are less likely to be 
committed to democracy. 
Second, they show that membership in relatively more independent organizations is not 
associated with understandings of democracy. The impacts of affiliation in religious 
groups (Pearson's r=.041) and in community development or self help associations 
(Peason's r=-.O 15) on understandings of democracy are statistically insignificant. And 
membership in community development or self help associations is also not related to 
commitment to democracy (Pearson's r=.003). However, people who belong to religious 
groups are more likely to be committed democrats (Pearson's r=.067*). 
Political participation in collective action 
Political participation refers to "legal activities by private citizens that are more or less 
directly or indirectly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and the 
actions they take" (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978). The underlying assumption is that people 
behave pragmatically, that is they take political actions and choose channels of 
representation on the basis of what works best. 
Voting is a well known form of political participation, however, there are other forms of 
participation apart from voting, such as campaigning and contacting (see Bratton, Mattes 
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005 :261-65). While voting is directly related to express partisan 
preferences during election periods, these other forms of political participation occur 
before and between elections. In this study, I consider the patterns of forms of political 
participation in legal activities through various forms of collective action like attending a 
community meeting, attending a demonstration or protest march, and getting together 











\Vhen ask~d ,,· h~ther :;"loz~mbic~ns h,l(1 allended ,I community medlng, gOI togclher wilh 
others to raise an issue. or mtended a demon,lration or proksl Imrch dllTing Ih~ p~,1 y~ar. 
six in ten (64 percen1) said Ihat Ihey had a1!ended a commuility meeting. three in ten (26 
p~r~cnt) had goltogelher with others to raisc an issue, and two in ten (15 percent) had 
a lIende(i ~ demon,trat ion or prole,l march (FIgure .1.1.1). 
Fi:::urt' 3,1 J: l'olitkal partidpation in l'ol lccth c ~ctjOtl 
0-'-_ 
... """dln! ,oo<,,,,,,,",,,, ""!t,"" <0""'''.' (0 ",,~ 




Que"ion: Here i, 0 Ji" of ><:lio'" that pcork ,omctlTn" t.k~ a, cllizen, For each oflh","". pic"," 
tcll mc whether YOlJ. pcr":,",,l ly. h,ve d(J!1e any of the,e thlll~' dunn!; the pa." ycar. If n(~. ""mid 
yo" do thi. if you h,d, cl~,oc<" 
I combined the answer to thcsc questions abolll political participalion in ~ 1,lrger valid ,llld 
reliable single dimension labeled collective action. I') This reflect, a common set of effort, 
thaI citizens undertake to organl/.c themselves to influence political officials. 
I us.c this larger COtBtruct, thaI ii;, collectivc action instead of the s.cpamte behavior, in the 
bivariate and multi,ariate analyses. TIle bivariate results show that collective action ,md 
understandings of ocmocmcv arc not at all correlated (Pe~rson' s r=.047), bUI 
::vtoz~mbic;llls ,,·ho p~rticipale in collecli\e aclion ilre more likely to be commitkd 
democrat s (Pe,trson . s r=. 184' '). 
" (s .. f,,11 d""ils in App<ud,x IJ of how Ihe COtnl""J!< inde~ oftho<t al1inJde, w", con'truct<d ",ing 










3.3. Multivariate Effects 
I have now summarized the various levels and sources of information that Mozambicans 
use, and the bivariate associations of these and attitudes to democracy. However, I now 
want to examine the simultaneous impact of all these taken together. By employing 
bivariate analysis we observed that interpersonal discussion of politics, formal education, 
media consumption and collective action, for instance, were associated with commitment 
to democracy. But this could not tell us which one matters more than the others. Thus, I 
test all information factors so far considered in this chapter against each other in a 
multivariate analysis on attitudes to democracy. 
Table 3.1 presents a multiple linear regression model that separately tests the impacts of 
levels and sources of information on two attitudes to democracy, understandings of 
democracy and commitment to democracy. The first and second column under each 
dependent variable contains the standardized regression coefficients (Beta). The levels of 
significance are in parentheses. I have highlighted all effects that are statistically 
significant, which indicates that the null hypothesis (which states that there is no 
relationship between the two variables) can be rejected. 
The negative or positive sIgn 111 each coefficient indicates the direction of the 
relationship. Non-significant effects means that the two variables are not at all connected. 
In the lasts rows I present the sample size (n) and the total explained variance (Adjusted 
R Square) of the model on each dependent variable. 
The evidence shows that Mozambicans who identify with political opposition and with 
the ruling party, belong to religious groups, and who are interested in public affairs are 
more likely to understand democracy as a set of procedures that 'allows everyone a free 
and equal voice in making decisions', with the effect of partisan identification with 
political opposition weighting more. On other hand, those who have access to news 











democracy procedurally. In other words, they are more likely to understand democracy 
substantively (e.g. 'democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone's basic 
needs'). However, the overall 'informational' model has only limited power, explaining 
only 2 percent of the total variance in understandings of democracy. 
Table 3.1: The effects of levels and sources of information and cognitive engagement 
on attitudes to democracy (multivariate linear regression) 
(Constant) 




Interpersonal discussion of politics 
Interest in public affairs 
Independent sources of information 
Membership in religious groups 
Membership in community development associations 
Contacting religious leaders 
Collective action 
Identification with opposition parties 
State aligned sources of information 
Membership in trade unions 
Membership in business groups 
Contacting local councilors 
Contacting officials of government ministries 
Contacting traditional rulers 
Contacting other community influentials 
Identification with the ruling party 
N 












































Note: The table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant 
impacts are highlighted in bold. 
With respect to sources of information, the effects of identification with opposition 
parties, membership in religious groups and in trade unions or farm associations are 
consistent with my hypothesis, since their effects are statistically significant and with 











organizations, and contacting traditional rulers and other community influential persons 
are also consistent with my hypothesis since their effects have right sign but are 
statistically insignificant. Inconsistent with my hypothesis is the effect of identification 
with the ruling party among those effects that are statistically significant and with 
opposite sign, while inconsistent among those effects that have opposite sign but are 
statistically insignificant are the effect of membership in community development 
associations and contacting religious leaders, local councilors and government officials. 
Turning to the second column, the results show that popular commitment to democracy in 
Mozambique is propelled by news media use, access to formal education, interpersonal 
discussion of politics, contacting religious leaders and officials of government ministries, 
and membership in religious groups. However, the consumption of news media has the 
greatest impact. On the other hand, contacting traditional rulers detracts from 
commitment to democracy. 
Informational factors are able to account for more variance in commitment to democracy 
than understandings of democracy. Overall, this informational model accounts for 
roughly 18 percent of total explained variance in commitment to democracy. 
With regard to sources of information, the impacts of membership in religious groups, 
contacting religious leaders and traditional rulers and participation in collective action are 
consistent with my hypothesis, since their impacts have right sign and are statistically 
significant. The impact of membership in community development organizations, 
business groups and trade unions, contacting local councilors and other community 
influential persons, and identification with the opposition parties are also consistent with 
my propositions, but their impacts are statistically insignificant. While the effect of 
contacting government officials is inconsistent with my hypothesis, since its effect has 
opposite sign and is statistically significant, the effect of identification with the ruling 











Summary of Findings 
I summarize the abovementioned findings as follows. I found, as unexpected, that there is 
no positive relationship between news media consumption and procedural understanding 
of democracy. On other hand, partisan identification with the ruling party and interest in 
public affairs appeared to be connected to procedural understanding of democracy, as 
also unexpected finding. I did not find any explanation for this. I cannot confidently say, 
for instance, that the negative effect of news media use on procedural understanding of 
democracy reflects the fact that most of the country bigger media are state aligned 
because on the other side, we observed that media consumption contribute positively on 
commitment to democracy. Maybe this specific aspect needs to be captured by qualitative 
analysis. The same I say with respect to the positive effect of identification with Frelimo 
party. 
As expected, it was confirmed that Mozambicans who identify with opposition parties 
and belong to relatively more independent groups, such as religious groups, are more 
likely to understand democracy as a set of procedures that 'allows everyone a free and 
equal voice in making decisions'. 
With respect to commitment to democracy, as unexpected, we observed that contacting 
officials of government ministries was connected with popular commitment to 
democracy. Explanation to this may also be captured via qualitative analysis. On other 
hand, as expected finding, it was confirmed that people with high levels of information 
(from news media use and access to formal education), discuss politics with friends or 
neighbors, and who obtain their information from relatively more independent sources 
(like contacting religious leaders, participate in collective actions or belong to religious 
groups) are more likely to be committed democrats than respondents who obtain their 
inforn1ation from sources that subvert the quality of democracy, that is aligned to the 
Mozambican state (such as contacting traditional rulers). Those who contact traditional 












The Basis of Mozambicans' Commitment to Democracy 
Improving democratic performance has been cited by many scholars as key to its 
consolidation. However, these scholars differ in the relative emphases they place on the 
nature of the performance. 'First generation' scholars emphasized economic performance 
factors, arguing that democratic regimes will be more likely to endure if they produce and 
broadly distribute improvements in living standards (Przerworski, 1991; Pereira, Maraval 
and Przerworski, 1993; Przerworski et al., 1996). In the African context, Claude Ake 
argued that "the democratic movement in Africa will emphasize concrete economic and 
social rights rather than abstract political rights" since "Africans are seeking democracy 
as a matter of survival" (Ake, 1996:239-44). 
On the other hand, 'second generation' researchers focused on the role of political 
performance factors (Evan and Whitefield, 1995; Diamond, 1997; Rose, Mishler and 
Haepfer, 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001), suggesting that "public assessments of 
democracy do not only involve the handling of the economy. How democratic 
governments meet expectations for public order, accountability, freedom, and 
constitutionalism may be no less important, or even more so" (Diamond, 1997:20). In 
fact, Evans and Whitefield have observed that "although both political and economic 
factors are found to be significant, multivariate analysis indicate that political experience 
is of greater weight than is economic" (Evans and Whitefield, 1995). Similarly, Rose, 
Mishler and Haepfer (1998) found that whereas economic factors do contribute for 
legitimation, politics matter more. 
Beyond the impact of levels and sources of information I ask whether people base their 
commitment to democracy on economic or political performance evaluations. I also ask 
whether the impact of levels and sources of information remains once we consider effects 











In this chapter, I examme first the patterns of political and economIC evaluations of 
political leaders and regimes performance in Mozambique. Second, I test and examine 
their bivariate effects on popular commitment to democracy. I then explore 
Mozambicans' commitment to democracy by testing and examining the effects of 
political and economic performance evaluations controlling for cognition (levels and 
sources of information, cognitive engagement and understandings of democracy), 
employing multivariate regression analysis. 
4.1. Economic Factors 
The Afrobarometer measured evaluations of economIC performance with questions 
asking people how well Mozambican government managed the economy, kept prices 
stable, created jobs, and narrowed gaps between rich and poor, whether the process of 
economic reform has resulted in greater availability of goods, jobs opportunities, or 
raised people standards of living. It also asked people for their present, relative, 
retrospective and prospective evaluations of the national economy and personal living 
conditions. 
Government handling economy 
Since the advent of Mozambique's World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
supported structural adj ustment programme in 1987 and 1990,20 the country has begun 
collecting the gains of market reform mainly through increased external investment,21 
hitting double digits (12) of economic growth in 1998. Over the same period, the country 
has also been adopting policies to control inflation. However, though the annual 
:0 In 1987 the structural adjustment programme was known as Economic Recovery Programme (Programa 
de Restrlltllra~iio Economica - PRE), and in 1990 it introduced its social component and so-called Social 
and Economic Recovery Programme (Programa de Reahilita(:(lo Economica e Social - PRES) (Castel-
Branco, 1996). 
: I Mozal - Mozambique smelter aluminum has been cited as the engine for higher economic growth 
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These separate attitudes toward government handling of economic matters represent a 
valid and reliable single dimension,23 which is used in further analyses. 
Testing the relationship between evaluations of government handling of the economy and 
public commitment to democracy I find that this economic factor does not contribute 
positively to Mozambicans' commitment to democracy. In fact, there is a statistically 
significant and strongly negative effect between evaluations of government handling of 
the economy and popular commitment to democracy (Pearson's r=-.227**). At this stage, 
it appears that the more positive Mozambicans evaluation of the government economic 
performance the less they are committed to democracy. 
Evaluations of economic reform 
In order to test public evaluations of the effects of the larger economic reform process, 
the Afrobarometer asked people whether their standard of living, the availability of 
goods, and jobs opportunities were better or worse than a few years before. We observe 
in Figure 4.2 that the proportion of respondents saying that the availability of jobs 
opportunities is worse or much worse is far higher (59 percent) than for their living 
standards (29 percent) or the availability of goods (21 percent). 
23 Factor analysis extracted a single unrotated factor with eigenvalue greater than one (1.714) which 
explains 56 percent of the common variance. Reliability analysis Cronbach's Alpha index is high (.7317) 
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Prospective economic evaluations show that more than half (54 percent) Mozambicans 
expect that the national economic condition will improve over the next twelve months 
while just under half (47 percent) expect that their living conditions will be good In 
twelve months time. However, this is not a really big difference. 
With respect to retrospective economic evaluations, just under half (46 percent) think that 
the country economic condition improved over the past twelve months ago; on other 
hand, just four in ten (38 percent) said their personal living conditions improved over the 
past twelve months. 
Regarding present economic evaluations, 50 percent and 37 percent, respectively, vote 
the present national economic condition and personal living conditions as good. 
Table 4.1: Economic evaluations 
Retrospective economic evaluations" 
National economic conditions 
Personal living conditions 
Prospective economic evaluations"" 
National economic conditions 
Personal living conditions 
Present economic evaluations""" 
National economic conditions 
Personal living conditions 
Relative economic evaluations"""" 
Country econ. conditions vs. other neighbor countries 










/\ Question: "Looking back, I) how do you rate the economic condition in this country, and 2) 
your living conditions, compared to twelve months ago?" 
1\1\ Question: Looking ahead, do you expect I) the economic conditions in this country, and 2) 
your living conditions, in twelve months time to be better or worse'?" 
/\1\/\ Question: "In general, how would you describe I) the present economic condition of this 
country. and 2) your own present living conditions?" 
/\I\I\I\Question: "In general how do you rate I) the economic condition in this country compared to 











Finally, with regard to relative economic evaluations, Mozambicans are more likely to 
see greater positive economic conditions in other countries (compared to Mozambique) 
or other ethnic groups (compared to their own). Indeed, just 35 percent and 31 percent 
perceive that the country economic condition compared to those in neighboring countries 
and personal living conditions compared to those of other Mozambicans are good, 
respectively. 
Each group of these economic evaluations was combined in a specific valid and reliable 
construct, which is used in bivariate and multivariate analyses. 25 What are the effects of 
these economic evaluations? Do they contribute to public commitment to democracy? 
Among the above mentioned factors, only present economic evaluations of government 
performance (Pearson's r=-.106**) and relative economic evaluations (Pearson's r=-
.111 **) have statistically significant effects, but their effects are negative. These signify 
that Mozambicans who are satisfied with current national and personal economic 
conditions as well as those who think that they are better than others are less likely to 
support democracy and reject authoritarian rule. The lack of statistical significance in 
prospective (Pearson's r=.036) and retrospective (Pearson's r=.053) economic 
evaluations indicates that they are not related to popular commitment to democracy in 
Mozambican context. 
4.2. Political Factors 
The Afrobarometer measured political performance evaluations by asking people about a 
range of factors, including performance of political incumbents (the president, the 
c) Variables measuring the present country economic condition and personal living conditions correlate 
with each other at r=.469** with a reliability of Alpha=.64 (n=1393). Variables measuring the country 
economic condition and personal living conditions compared to others correlate to each other at r=.45** 
with a reliability Alpha =.62 (n=1395). Variables measuring retrospective country economic condition and 
personal living conditions correlate to each other at r=.511 ** with a reliability Alpha=.665 (n= 1386). 
Variables measuring prospective country economic condition and personal living conditions correlate each 











member of parliament and the local mayor), levels of official corruption, and whether the 
current regime is delivering more political rights (including freedom to say what you 
think, to join any political organization you want, from false arrest when you are 
innocent, to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, the ability of ordinary 
people to influence what government does, and safety from crime or violence) than the 
previous one-party regime. 
Delivery of political rights 
After centuries of colonial domination, the movement that liberated Mozambique in 1975 
established a system of government that did not deliver liberties even though they were 
broadly promised. The Frelimo communist party-state system in Mozambique was 
repressive and coercive. Comparing the current multiparty regime with the former, how 
do Mozambicans evaluate the delivery of political rights by the current multiparty regime 
compared to the former Frelimo communist party-state regime? 
The data indicate that Mozambicans say that the delivery of political rights is better or 
much better in the democratic government than the old one-party regime. Overwhelming 
majorities of 78 percent, 77 percent and 76 percent respectively say that the freedom to 
say what you think, choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, and to join any 
political organization are better or much better under the current regime than the old one. 
In addition, five in ten also felt that the ability of ordinary people to influence 
government (54 percent) and the freedom from false arrest (55 percent) is better or much 
better. However, just under half (41 percent) felt that safety from crime or violence is 
better or much better in the multiparty regime compared to the former Frelimo 
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Perceived official corruption 
Corruption has become a highly visible issue in Mozambique involving alleged 
"untouchables" of governing party elite related to the murder of investigative journalist in 
2000 and a senior official of the Central Bank in 2001, both investigating corruption 
cases. While for the first case Mozambicans saw on television a live trial of an 
"untouchable,,,27 the trial for the second case had not yet occurred. In addition, the police 
together with guards from the justice sector are responsible for releasing many criminals 
especially the assassin of investigative journalist in 2000 from the maximum security 
prIson. 
Besides that, corruption penetrates many other civil services. Corruption among teachers 
and school administrators is perpetrated by people seeking favors or obtaining a place at 
school or to pass exams, while amongst border officials it involves attempts to import and 
export goods, especially alcohol. 
Expert opinion, in the form of the Transparency International, locates Mozambique as 
one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Transparency International, 2006; 
Mediafax of November 15,2006). Similarly, the World Bank corruption score for 2005 is 
low (31 ),28 suggesting high levels of corruption. 
The Afrobarometer question on corruption defines it as a situation "where those in 
government and the civil service take money or gifts from the people and use it for 
themselves, or expect people to pay extra money or a gift to do their job" (Bratton, 
Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Subjective perceptions from the Afrobarometer survey 
data reveal that corruption is seen as highest among border officials (34 percent), the 
police (33 percent), and teachers and school administrators (25 percent), (see Figure 4.4). 
27 One of the killers implicated the son of the former President, Joaquim Chissano, as the one who asked 
and paid them to execute the journalist. 
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4.3. Multiple Effects 
All the potential influences on popular commitment to democracy so far considered in the 
past chapters were included in a multivariate linear regression analysis. Model 1 in Table 
4.2 reflects the effects of economic performance evaluations factors on popular 
commitment to democracy, while Model 2 represents the models of political evaluations. 
Analyzing these two models we observe both economic (.109) and political (.110) models 
account for roughly equal levels of explained variance in commitment to democracy. 
However, political models account for slightly more variance than economic ones. 
Model 3 shows the joint effects of economic and political evaluations factors on popular 
commitment to democracy. The results show that, with the exception of prospective 
economic evaluations, all economic and political indicators contribute significantly to 
commitment to democracy. Government handling economy, delivery of political rights, 
perceived official corruption, safety from crime or violence and evaluations of economic 
reform have greater impact on commitment to democracy than present, relative and 
retrospective economic evaluations and performance of political incumbents. However, 
the impacts of government handling economy, safety from crime or violence and present 
and relative economic evaluations are negative. 
These findings suggests the following: Mozambicans who think their government is 
handling the economy well are less likely to be committed to democracy, while those 
who perceive an improved delivery of political rights (including freedom to say what 
they think, to join any political organization, to choose who to vote for without feeling 
pressured, freedom from false arrest, and the ability to influence government) are more 











Mozambicans who perceive improvements in safety from crime or violence under the 
current multiparty system are less likely to be committed democrats. As argued earlier, 
this suggests that Mozambicans do not see their own personal safety as part of that same 
basket. In fact, it even suggests that those who feel safer now than under the old regime 
do not credit that safety to the advent of democracy. Those who perceive official 
corruption are more likely to be committed democrats in Mozambique. They demand 
decent and clean government, transparency and ethics in governance as well as respect 
for democratic procedures. 
While Mozambicans who perceIve economIc reform, performance of political 
incumbents and retrospective economic evaluations positively are much likely to develop 
democratic commitments, those who perceive that their present and relative economic 
conditions improved are less likely to be committed democrats. 
Overall, to what extent are public orientations to democracy formed by economic and 
political performance evaluations? The Adjusted R Square shows that economic and 
political factors explain 18 percent of the variation in commitment to democracy. This 
suggests an important impact with virtually no difference in the explanatory impact of 
political versus economic factors. 
Model 4 drops the indicators which are statistically insignificant in order to estimate a 
more accurate Adjusted R Square and develop a more parsimonious model (Kerry, Hall 
and Kozub, 2003). The results show that with the exception of retrospective and relative 
economic evaluations, all economic and political considerations maintain the same 
ranking order and sign. Relative economic evaluations which ranked ahead retrospective 
economic evaluations under the previous Model 3, now rank behind retrospective 
economic evaluations under Model 4. When dropped off statistically insignificant effect 
(prospective economic evaluations) from the analysis, Model 4 account for 17 percent of 











Table 4.2: The effects of performance evaluations on commitment to democracy (multivariate linear regression) 
Model I Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(significant Adjusted R Cumulative 
effects) Square Adjusted R 
(block) Square 
(Constant) (.352) (.000) (.00 I) (.000) 
Economic evaluations 
Evaluations of economic reform .199(.000) .136 (.000) .141 (.000) 
Government handling economy -.260 (.000) -.219 (.000) -.2]6 (000) 
Present economic evaluations -.105 (.000) -.083 (.003) -.077 (.006) 
Relative economic evaluations -.103 (.001) -.085 (.004) -.080 (.006) 
Retrospective econ. evaluations .094 (.002) .085 (.004) .101 (000) 
Prospective econ. evaluations .065 (.034) .047 (.111) 
.106 .106 
Political evaluations 
Delivery of political rights .220 (.000) .179 (.000) .182 (.000) 
Perceived official corruption .]53 (.000) .144 (.000) .146 (.000) 
Perfonn. of political incumbents .039 (.137) .052 (.047) .054 (.038) 
Safety from crime or violence -.231 (.000) -.161 (.000) -.159 (.000) 
.110 .174 
N 1400 1400 1400 1400 
Adjusted R Square .109 .Il 0 .175 .174 











To finalize, I find that economic and political performance evaluation considerations do 
matter to the development of individual democratic commitments. In contrast to the great 
bulk of the public opinion literature, I find no evidence for the primacy of the political: in 
Mozambique both politics and economics contribute equally to democratic commitment. 
Do the impacts of economic and political performance evaluations remain even after we 
take cognitive influences into consideration in the analysis? This is the question that I 
answer in the section that follows. 
Adding cognitive factors 
Models I and 2 in Table 4.3 show the effect of adding cognitive considerations (levels 
and sources of information, cognitive engagement and understandings of democracy) to 
our multivariate account of commitment to democracy. While Model I shows the effects 
of all cognitive and performance evaluation indicators, Model 2 drops all statistically 
insignificant indicators to obtain a more accurate estimate of Adjusted R Square and a 
more parsimonious model. 
The evidence shows that even after accounting for economic and political performance 
evaluations, we continue to observe that Mozambicans with high levels of information 
(from news media use and access to formal education), discuss politics with friends or 
neighbors, and who obtain their information from relatively more independent sources 
(like participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to 
be committed to democracy than those who obtain their information from state aligned 
sources (particularly contacting traditional rulers) (Modell in Table 4.3). However, those 












Table 4.3: The effects of performance evaluations and cognition on commitment to 
democracy ~multivariate linear regression~ 
Modell Model 2 




Evaluations of economic refonn .098 (.000) .110 (000) 
Government handling economy -.209 (000) -.219 (000) 
Present economic evaluations -.033 (.241) 
Relative economic evaluations -.039 (.179) 
Retrospective econ. evaluations .057 (.055) 
Prospective economic evaluations .017 (582) 
.086 .085 
Political evaluations 
Delivery of political rights .115 (.000) .122 (000) 
Perceived official corruption .094 (.000) .081 (001) 
Perform. of political incumbents .015 (.585) 
Safety from crime or violence -.068 (.013) -.086 (.001) 
.111 .156 
Levels of information 
Media usage .168 (.000) .173 (000) 
Formal education .068 (.031) .088 (.000) 
Cognitive engagement .138 .226 
Interpersonal discussion of politics .093 (.003) .103 (.001) 
Interest in public affairs -.054 (.040) -.050 (.044) 
.067 .241 
Independent sources of information 
Membership in religious groups .020 (.442) 
Memb. in community. devel. assoc. .022 (.434) 
Contacting religious leaders .065 (.031) .071 (.010) 
Collective action .075 (.012) .066 (.020) 
Identification wi opposition parties .081(.153) 
.035 .244 
State aligned sources of information 
Membership in trade unions -.039 (.147) 
Membership in business groups .002 (.956) 
Contacting local councilors -.039 (147) 
Contacting government officials .049 (.089) 
Contacting traditional ruler -.094 (.004) -.093 (.001) 
Cont. other community influentials -.001 (.962) 
Identification with the ruling party .004 (.434) 
.012 .249 
Procedural unders. of democracy .073 (.004) .079 (.001) 
.015 .255 
Adiusted R Sguare .257 .255 
Note: Table shows standardized beta coefficients. Levels of significance are in parentheses. Significant 











Lastly the evidence shows that understanding democracy as a set of procedures that 
'allows everyone an equal and free voice in making decisions' or 'as an end in itself' 
matter positively for popular commitment to democracy, compared to seeing it 'as a 
mean to other ends', like socio-economic development. In fact, the more people 
understand, view or regard democracy procedurally, the more they become committed to 
democracy. 
Taken together, political and economic performance evaluations and cognitive factors 
explain 26 percent of variance in public commitment to democracy. This explained 
variance drops very little when statistically insignificant effects are removed in Model 2. 
In fact, most of the statistically significant effects increase when irrelevant effects are 
removed from the analysis. Government handling economy ranks ahead all other 
indicators, suggesting the greatest impact. Media use ranks behind government handling 
economy followed by delivery of political rights, evaluations of economic reform and 
interpersonal discussion of politics. Contacting traditional rulers, ranks behind 
interpersonal discussion of politics followed by formal education, safety from crime, 
perceived official corruption, procedural understandings of democracy, contacting 
religious leaders, participation in collective action and interest in public affairs. 
To what extent does each theoretical family explain public commitment to democracy? 
Weighting the explanatory power of each model in the analysis, the results suggest that 
Mozambicans' commitment to democracy is principally explained by levels of 
information from news media use and formal education, followed by political 
performance evaluations (delivery of political rights, official corruption and safety from 
crime). I now find moderate consistency with the literature that although economic 
performance factors contribute to the legitimacy of democracy, political performance 
factors matter more. While economic performance and cognitive engagement factors 











and relatively more independent sources and understandings of democracy have weaker, 
though significant, effects (see middle column of Model 2 in Table 4.3). 
Summary of Findings 
In this chapter I first hypothesized that popular commitment to democracy is based on 
evaluations of political rather than economic performance, and second that Mozambicans 
who have high levels of information and obtain their information from relatively more 
independent sources are more likely to be committed to democracy. Third, I proposed 
that people who understand democracy as a set of procedures that 'allows everyone a free 
and equal voice in making decisions' are also more likely to be committed democrats. 
I find that economic and political performance evaluation considerations do matter to 
development of democratic commitments but political factors matter more when tested 
simultaneously against competing explanations based on economic perfornlance 
evaluations, cognitive engagement, independent versus state aligned sources of 
information and understandings of democracy. Government handling of the economy has 
the greatest significant impact on support for democracy and rejection of authoritarian 
regimes, but it is negative. However, delivery of political rights contributes significantly 
and is positively associated with commitment to democracy. It ranks behind only 
government handling of the economy. I also find that safety from crime, perception of 
official corruption, evaluations of economic reform, retrospective, relative and present 
economic evaluations as well as perfonnance of political incumbents are relevant for 
commitment to democracy, but safety from crime, and relative and present economic 
conditions have negative impacts. 
Adding cognitive considerations, I reconfirm that Mozambicans who have high levels of 
information (like news media use and access to formal education) and obtain their 
information from relatively more independent, critical sources (such as participation in 











democracy than those who obtain their information from sources that subvert and 
constrain democratic procedures and the quality of democracy (like contacting traditional 
rulers). However, while those Mozambicans who discuss politics are also more likely to 
be committed to democracy, those who are interested in public affairs are less likely to do 
so. Nevertheless, contacting government officials is relevant and associated with 
commitment to democracy positively, as unexpected. 
In addition, I also confirm, as expected, that people who understand democracy as a set of 
procedures that 'allows everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions' are more 
likely to be committed to democracy than those who view, regard or understand 
democracy 'as a means to other ends' like alleviation of poverty, improvement of people 













I conclude this dissertation summarizing the features of two attitudes toward democracy: 
understandings of and commitment to democracy (e.g. support for democracy and 
rejection of one-party, military and one-man rule) and the main findings, discussing the 
study findings, drawing theoretical and political implications of the findings as well as 
pointing some strategies of social change. My findings are based on a micro-level 
analysis of a cross-sectional design randomly selected representative sample survey of 
1400 adult Mozambican population from Round 2 of the Afrobarometer, collected 
through personal interview in August and October 2002. 
My main findings are as follows. First, levels of information models are the main source 
of popular commitment to democracy when taken into account simultaneously competing 
explanations based on economic and political performance evaluations, cognitive 
engagement, independent versus state aligned sources of information and understandings 
of democracy models. Second, both evaluations of economic and political performance 
matter for Mozambicans' commitment to democracy. Third, the effects of political 
performance matter more than economics. Fourth, people who have high levels of 
information (from news media use and formal education), discuss politics with friends or 
neighbors and obtain their information from more independent sources (such as 
participation in collective action and contacting religious leaders) are more likely to be 
committed democrats. Fifth, procedural understandings of democracy are positively 











Popular understandings of and commitment to democracy: 
Mozambicans in comparative perspective 
This study makes clear that ordinary Mozambicans are less committed to democracy than 
many other Africans from 16 Afrobarometer countries observed between 2002 and 2004. 
We observed moderate levels of support for democracy (54 percent) and rejection of 
military rule (56 percent), and weak rejection of one-party (46 percent) and one-man rule 
(47 percent). These low levels of mass public commitment to democracy reflect low 
levels of elite commitments to democracy. While the Mozambican political elite agree on 
the rules for competing for power they do not yet enforce limits on state authority. 
All electoral institutions, including the constitutional council judiciary, are controlled by 
the ruling party reducing the scope of political competition and participation. The entire 
state authority rests on the president who is both head of state and of government, and the 
parliament cannot hold the head of government accountable since the constitution allows 
him to appoint or fire the premier whenever he wants. The political implications of these 
low levels of commitment to democracy at both the elite and mass levels means that 
democracy will be less likely to survive and consolidate (Linz and Stepan, 1996; 
Diamond, 1997; Mishler and Haerpfer, 1998; Diamond, 1999) in Mozambique. 
Nevertheless, the data suggests that Mozambicans understand democracy procedurally -
e.g. as a set of procedures that 'allows everyone a free and equal voice in making 
decisions' (61 percent). The concept of democracy described by Mozambicans is both 
liberal and participatory, however this measure only taps the single aspect of 'free and 
equal voice in making decisions' but not a full range of liberal procedures, meaning that 
further analysis need to includes more comprehensive measures of liberal procedures 
(including civil liberties and political rights, equality and justice, popular participation, 
peace and unity). It should be seen, however, that popular understandings of democracy 
in liberal and procedural terms is by itself not sufficient to qualify the country regime as a 
'liberal democracy'. As classified by Diamond (2002), Mozambique is at his best an 











Democratic procedures are frequently subverted, civil liberties abused, and elections in 
some cases are fraudulent and result in violence, especially the 1999 national and 2005 
local elections in Montepuez and Mocimboa da Praia. 
In comparison to the rest of the 16 Afrobarometer countries, Mozambicans' procedural 
understandings of democracy rank ahead Southern African countries and in sub Sahara 
African countries, rank behind Cape Verdeans and Tanzanians. These relatively high 
levels of procedural understandings of democracy may reflect the role played by an 
enormous information network of voter education campaigns mainly in the 1994 
founding elections involving "almost all the country broadcasting, video and 
advertisement companies, dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young 
Mozambicans" (de Maia, 1996). This campaign was "to mobilize the public, first to 
register as voters, and then for the actual voting itself' (de Maia, 1996: 151), but voter 
education agents first had to explain the meaning of the concept of democracy. These 
relatively high levels of procedural understandings of democracy may also reflect the 
long history of conflict and violence that Mozambicans see procedures as a form of 
conflict resolution. 
Finally, I square these high levels of procedural understandings of democracy with lower 
levels of actual commitment to democracy by the limited range that the measure of 
procedural understandings of democracy taps, using Round 2 Afrobarometer survey. If I 
was able to include a full or range of liberal procedures in the measure of understandings 
of democracy, I think that the procedural understandings of democracy would fall to the 
levels of actual commitment to democracy. 
Discussion 
Casting lights on the influences of levels of information, legitimacy of democracy is 
significantly and positively propelled by high levels of news media use and of formal 











Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) and news media use prompt policy discussion and enhance "civic 
consciousness" (Hyden, 2002). 
Reflecting the influences of 'first generation' scholars (Przerworski, 1991; Pereira, 
Maraval and Przerworski, 1993; Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996: Przerworski et aI., 1996), the 
study of consolidation of democracy has been dominated by accounts based on the 
necessity of the democratic regime, and of incumbents and governments to produce 
positive economic performance. In contrast, weighing the explanatory power of 
performance models, I find that political performance matters more than economic 
explanations, and come next after levels of information in the ranking order of explaining 
political legitimacy. In addition, while economic performance of the government matters, 
the direction of this impact is negative. On other hand, positive performance in delivery 
of political rights contributes significantly and positively to democratic commitment. 
This confirms the 'second generation' researchers (Evans and Whitefield, 1995; 
Diamond, 1997; Rose, Mishler and Haepfer, 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001) who have 
focused on the role of political performance factors, suggesting that "how democratic 
governments meet expectations for public order, accountability, freedom, and 
constitutionalism may be no less important, or even more so" (Diamond, 1997). 
Safety from cnme or violence, official corruption, evaluations of economic reform, 
retrospective, relative and present economic evaluations and performance of political 
incumbents also contribute significantly to support for democracy. However, the impacts 
of safety from crime, and present and relative economic evaluations are negative. The 
effects of present and relative economic evaluations reconfirm that producing positive 
economic reform is not a requirement of democratic consolidation. Inconsistent with this 
theory is the positive effect of evaluations of economic reform and retrospective 
economIC evaluations, which support to lesser extent 'first generation' scholars 
(Przerworski, 1991; Pereira, Maraval and Przerworski, 1993; Elster, 1993; Ake, 1996; 
Przerworski et aI., 1996). The negative effect of the relative safety from crime is 
inconsistent to my hypothesis, suggesting that ordinary Mozambican citizens do not see 











who feel safer now than under the old regime do not credit that safety to the advent of 
democracy. 
With respect to the relevance of official corruption, official corruption IS to be 
significantly and negatively related to democracy, because official corruption creates 
public disgust and disillusionment (Diamond, 1997; Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 
2005). The effect of official corruption in Mozambique appears to be significantly and 
positively associated with support for democracy, because political corruption makes 
people to demand clean and decent government, transparency, accountability, the rule of 
law and good governance. 
The positive stimulus of interpersonal discussion of politics on mass public commitment 
to democracy is due to the fact that these networks are based on trust and have great 
coverage (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944). This suggests that individuals not 
only acquire information through news media or formal education but can also learn from 
others, where they add their personal experiences to that of others (Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1998). Thus, this also means that acquiring information from alternative 
informal sources also matters for democratic consolidation beyond obtaining information 
by being taught and, or from formal sources. 
Considering the impacts of sources of information, positive attitudes to democracy --
procedural understandings of and commitment to democracy -- are more likely to be 
transmitted from relatively more independent or non-state controlled sources of 
information, because the state and or ruling party (i.e. Frelimo) subvert the quality of 
democracy and democratic procedures. 
Conventional views of African politics strongly suggest that Africans support democracy 
largely on the basis of substantive understandings of democracy (Ake, 1993). However, 
although 'what democracy does', "its concrete outcomes" or "a specific content to 
policy" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005) are more tangible aspects of 











2005) or democratic rules or procedures are what matters positively to building and 
consolidating democracy. 
To finalize, the process of being committed to democracy in Mozambique is shaped by 
the larger legacies of Portuguese colonialism and the post independence civil war, 
especially its deleterious effects on formal education and news media. Frelimo's 
communist style party-state system legacy, especially its control over the society means 
that many Mozambicans obtain their information from sources that subvert democratic 
procedures. It is from these legacies that Mozambicans collectively learn about 
democracy or become committed to democracy depending on how democracy 
performs. 31 
Yet the legitimacy' process is also shaped by the legacies played by an enormous 
information network of voter education campaigns in the 1994 founding elections 
involving "almost all the country broadcasting, video and advertisement companies, 
dozens of related institutions, and thousands of young Mozambicans" (de Maia, 1996) in 
explaining them the meaning of the concept of democracy as well as the long history of 
conflicts that were key to see or understand democracy procedurally. However, this type 
of conclusions may be more salient when tested and captured in cross-national 
(comparative) perspective (see Gunther, R. and Mughan, A. 2000). 
,I The notion of "collective" learning point to historical periods effects that impart a set of common lessons 
across all people in a country regardless of age or generation (Barner-Barry and Orenwein, 1985). The 
dramatic vents of political transitions, such as the total breakdown of the institutions and value structure of 
the ancien regime, or the founding election of a new regime, might provide such effects, creating re-
socialization across all people and a society-wide transfer of regime loyalties (Bermeo, 1992; Schmitt-Beck 
and Voltmer, 2004; Gunther Montero and Torcal, 2004). As such, the macro-level crystallization of mass 
public attitudes in a new democracy may resemble the types of micro-level attitude change that occur in 












Strategies to support the process of democratization 
Transposing my findings to policy and practice I raise some strategies to support the 
process of democratization in Mozambique. 
To practitioners, such as members of parliament, political parties, and leaders of interest 
groups and movements, I emphasize the need "to enforce limits on state authority, no 
matter which party or faction may control the state at a given time" (Diamond, 1997). 
This is necessary to deep "democratic structures to make them more liberal, accessible, 
accountable, and representative; and strengthening the formal institutions of democracy, 
including parties, legislatures, and the judicial system" (Diamond, 1997). 
Thus, the Mozambique' highly presidentialized system of government should be 
converted to parliamentary system to make the government more accountable to the 
legislature. The judiciary should be more independent and autonomous "to enforce the 
law equally toward everyone, including those in government" (O'Donnell, 2005). The 
electoral institutions, including the Constitutional Council should be more independent, 
impartial or not controlled or dominated by the ruling party to improve the scope of 
political competition and of participation. Any government tentative of strategy of 
development without making first these political reforms will be a fallacy. 
Voter education campaigns explaining the meaning of the concept of democracy, which 
may be a reflection of high levels of procedural understandings of democracy 10 
Mozambique, should not stop after an election. However, because strategies of 
development must be emphasized in association with the study findings rather than a 
reflection, procedural understandings of democracy should be taught at school or 
introduced into school curricula, since formal education appeared to be positively related 












In this way, the strategies of development to increase levels of actual commitment to 
democracy must come from its significant and positive predictors rather than a possible 
reflection, such as an agreement to enforce limits on state authority.32 In this way, to 
increase the levels of actual commitment to democracy it is important to increase levels 
of information, especially by broadening access to formal education and independent 
news media. However, training programs and capacity building or civic education 
campaign at schools curricula and mass media about democratic citizenship and 
procedures, and rules to empower ordinary citizens on democratic Issues are also 
relevant. This cognitive strategy should also be extended to non-state aligned or relatively 
more independent organizations and religious leaders, since they matter positively in 
development of democratic commitments. 
To ordinary Mozambicans, they should engage more in interpersonal discussion of 
politics and participate more in collective action in order to build greater democratic 
legitimacy. Overall, in terms of cognition, I point that the strategy of democratic 
development should be based on positive and significant impacts of how much 
Mozambicans know and where they obtain their information, but understand democracy 
as a set of procedures that 'allow everyone a free and equal voice in making decisions' 
also matter positively. 
Since people support democracy because they think that democracy work better than any 
other form of government worldwide experienced, Mozambican democratic governments 
should improve their political performance in delivering political rights (including 
freedom to say what you think, to join any political organization, from false arrest, to 
choose who to vote for without feeling pressured, and the ability of ordinary people to 
influence government). But also economic reform should address problems of 
inequalities instead of just producing relatively strong economic growth and debt 
32 Enforcing limits on state authority may contribute to the legitimacy of democracy in Mozambique, but 
because this study does not address and find that we cannot emphasize that enforcing limits on state 
authority is a strategy of development to improve levels of actual commitment to democracy. The strategies 
of development must come from study findings. However, it could be interesting in further studies to probe 











alleviation that are not being reflected at micro-levels (in terms of improvement ofpeop1e 












Operationalization of the Variables 
Commitment to democracy is measured by support (preference) for democracy and 
rejections of three forms of authoritarian regimes: one-party, military, and one-man rule. 
a) Support fin' democracy is measured by question: "which of these three statements is 
closest to your own opinion?' A. Democracy is preferable to any other kind of 
government; B. In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; 
and C. For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have'. 
b) Rejection of authoritarian regimes is measured by: "There are many ways of govern a 
country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? A. Only one 
political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office; C. The army comes in to 
govern the country; and D. Elections and the Assembly of the Republic are abolished so 
that the President can decide everything. Those who prefer democracy and strongly 
disapprove authoritarian regimes are deemed to be committed democrats. 
Procedural versus substantive understandings of democracy is measured by: "Which of 
the following statement is close to your view? Statement A or statement B. Statement A: 
Democracy is worth having because it allows everyone a free and equal voice in making 
decisions". Statement B: Democracy is only worth having if it can address everyone's 
basic needs". Respondents who say statement A are deemed to understanding democracy 
procedurally - i.e. as an end in itself/what democracy is. 
Formal education IS measured by: "What IS the highest level of education you have 
completed?" 












Interest in public affairs is measured by: "How interested are you in public affairs?" 
Interpersonal discussion of politics is measured by "How often do you discuss politics 
with friends or neighbors?" 
Contacted influential persons is measured by: "During the past year, how often have you 
contacted a political party official, an official of government ministry, a local councilor, a 
traditional ruler, a religious leader, other influential person for help to solve a problem or 
to give them your view? 
Affiliation in associations or group membership is measured by: "I am going to read you 
a list of voluntary organizations. For each tell me whether you are official member, an 
active member, or not a member? A religious group (e.g. church or mosque), a trade 
union, a professional or business association, and a community development or self-help 
association. 
Party identffication is measured by: "Do you feel close to any particular political party? 
(If yes), which party is that? 
Political participation in collective action is measured by: "Here is a list of actions that 
people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you 
personally, have done any of these things during past year. (If not), would do this if you 
had a chance? Attended a community meeting; getting together with others to raise an 













Delivery of political rights is measured by: "Comparing the democratic regime and the 
previous party-state system, please tell me if the following things are worse or better now 
than they used to be or about the same: a) freedom to say what you think, b) freedom to 
join any political party you want, c) freedom from being arrested when you are innocent, 
d) freedom to choose who vote for without feeling pressured, e) the ability of ordinary 
people to influence what government does. 
Perceived official corruption is measured by: "How many of the following do you thing 
are involved in corruption: a) The president and officials in his office, b) elected leaders, 
c) government officials, d) the police, e) border officials, f) teachers and school 
administrators and g) judges and magistrates. 
Performance of political incumbents is measured by: "do you approve or disapprove of 
the way that the following person has performed their jobs over the past twelve months, 
or haven't you heard about them to say?" a) The president, b) members of parliament, 
and c) the local mayor. 
Safetyfi'om crime or violence is measured by: "Comparing the democratic regime and the 
previous party-state system, please tell me if the following things are worse or better now 












Evaluations of economic reform is measured by: "Tell me if the following things are 
worse or better now than they use to be, or about the same: a) the availability of goods, b) 
people standard ofliving, c) the availability of job opportunities?". 
Government handling economy is measured by: "How well or badly would you say the 
current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough about 
them to say: a) managing the economy, b) keeping prices stable, c) creating jobs and d) 
narrowing gaps between rich and poor?" 
Relative economic evaluations 
How would you rate a) the economic conditions in this country compared to those in 
neighboring countries, and b) your living conditions compared to those other 
Mozambicans? 
Present economic evaluations 
How would you rate the following a) present economic condition of this country, and b) 
your present living conditions? 
Retrospective economic evaluations 
How would you rate the following compared to twelve months ago a) the economIC 
condition of this country, and b) your living conditions? 
Pro.~pective economic evaluations 
How do you expect the following to be better or worse a) economic conditions in this 












Multi Item Composite Indices 
This dissertation employs three types of indicators: single item, two-item constructs, and 
a set or cluster of items represented in a single composite index, which I call multi index. 
Single item reflects one survey question; two-item constructs represent two survey 
questions; and multi index reflects at least three survey questions. How do I construct two 
item constructs and multi indices? 
Two-item constructs are constructed by employing reliability analysis (Alpha) and 
Pearson's correlation. The two-items must be reliable at least at .50 and correlate to each 
other. 
Multi indices are constructed by employing factor and reliability analyses. While factor 
analyses test the validity of the index being constructed; reliability analysis tests its 
internal consistency. The acceptability of these analyses depend on certain statistical 
rules: In factor analysis, the single items by which we pretend to construct a composite 
index must generate one factor and an eigenvalue greater than 1; while reliability analysis 
acceptability require a value greater than or equal to .60. 
My factor and reliability analyses are based on Maximum Likelihood extraction method, 
and Direct Oblimin rotation. The strengths of combination of Maximum Likelihood 
extraction with Direct Oblimin rotation is "guaranteeing that if a factor solution can be 
found, it will also be found via all other methods" (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 
2005:355). Factor and reliability analyses reflect valid responses, including don't know. 
Missing data, refusals to answer and cases where a question was not applicable are 
excluded, not only from the calculation of factor and reliability analyses, but from the 











Commitment to democracy index 
Reject Military rule 
Reject One-man rule 
Reject One-party rule 






Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue= 1.521, and cornrnon variance of 51 
percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha =.65. Number of cases (n= 1385). 
Perceived official corruption Index 




Judges and magistrates 
Border officials 









Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =3.86, and common variance of 61.83 
percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.895, number of cases (n= 1393). 
Delivery of Political Rights Index 
Freedom to join any political organization that you want 
Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured 
Freedom to say what you think 
The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does 







Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =2.296, and common variance of 56.241 
percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.79.6, number of cases (n=1400). 
Evaluations of economic reform index 
People's standard ofliving 
The availability of goods 





Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =1.396, and cornrnon variance of 60.7 











Government handling economy index 
Keeping prices stable 
Creating jobs 
Narrowing gaps between rich and poor 






Factor analysis: single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue =1.714, and common variance of 56 
percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.73, number of cases (n=1400). 








Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.659 and common variance of 65.994 
percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.73, number of cases (n=1399). 
Participation in collective action index 
Got together with others to raise an issue 
Attended a demonstration or protest march 





Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue= 1.218 and common variance of 58.65 
percent. Reliability analysis: Cronbach's Alpha=.6307, number of cases (n=1400). 
Performance of political incumbents' index 
The president 






Factor analysis: a single unrotated factor was extracted, eigenvalue=1.267 and common variance of 58.5 












Round 2 Afrobarometer Survey 
The Afrobarometer33 is an "independent, non-partisan research project that measures the 
social, political and economic atmosphere in sub-Saharan Africa" (Bratton et aI, 2004). It 
is dedicated to three main objectives: 
• to produce scientifically reliable data on public opinion in Africa; 
• to strengthen capacity for survey research in African institutions; and 
• to broadly disseminate and apply survey results. 
By employing surveys based on personal interviews in local languages with a randomly 
selected representative sample of the national population, the Round 2 of the 
Afrobarometer survey was conducted in 16 sub-Saharan African countries: Cape Verde, 
Mozambique, Kenya, Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, South Africa, Mali, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Zambia, Botswana, Tanzania, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Nigeria between 2002 and 2003. 
However, due political instability, Round 2 Afrobarometer survey was conducted later in 
2004 in Zimbabwe. "Because the instrument asks a standard set of questions, countries 
are systematically compared and trends are tracked over time" (Bratton et aI, 2004). In 
Mozambique, the Round 2 was implemented in August and October 2002. 
Methodology 
The Afrobarometer through its partner in Mozambique - the Service (~/ Public Opinion 
and Democracy of the Centre 0/ Population Studies at the Eduardo Mondlane University 
- surveyed a nationally representative, multi-stage, area strat~fied cluster sample of 1400 
Mozambican citizens, J 8 years and older. The sample was designed by the National 











Institute of Statistics. At confidence level of 95 percent, a sample of this size allows a 
confidence interval, or margin of error, of plus or minus 2.5 percentage points. This 
means that, had we interviewed every Mozambicans, the results would d([{er from those 
(~{ this survey by no more than 2.5 percentage points, nineteen times out of twenty. 
Interviews were conducted at 115 sites distributed across all three regions (North, South 
and Central), all provinces, and across rural and urban areas within each provinces. An 
average (~{ 12 interviews per site was conducted. In order to make sure that women's 
voice were fully reflected, every second interview had to be with a female re5pondent. An 
equal number q{ interviews were conducted across ten provinces, plus Maputo City. 
Then, based on the 1997 Census, all the interviews were weighted to reflect each 
province and urban d([{erences proportionally with Maputo city treated as a separate 
province. 
Intervievvs were conducted in Portuguese (the official language) and in four other 
national languages (Changana, Sena, Ndau and Macua). The research instrument was a 
questionnaire containing structured and semi-structured items administered face-to face 
to re5pondents by teams (if trained interviewers. To adapt the questionnaire to local 
conditions, all items were pre-tested in trial interviews in urban and rural areas. The 
original Portuguese version was translated into all relevant home languages and all 
interviews were administered in the language of the re5pondent 's choice. 
Potential obstacles 
Several potential obstacles presented themselves to AFobarometer interviewers during 
the course q{ this survey. First q{ all, we found that Mozambicans still need to get used to 
the notion that .fieldworkers and researchers can represent independent organizations 
and universities. Even though we went to great lengths to tell people in the sample 
households that .ve represented the Afrobarometer and Eduardo Mondlane University 











interview - that they thought that we had been sent by "the government, " another 3 
percent said "Frelimo," and i percent said "the president." Only 5 percent said 
"UEM. " At the same time, we should note that there is no evidence that this perception 
affected the responses. To check this, we looked at re5ponses to three politically sensitive 
questions: i) What parties did support?; 2) Did they approve of the performance of the 
president?; and 3 Did they approve of the performance of the national assembly? We 
find that those re5pondents who thought we were from official sources (government, 
Frelimo the president) were no more likely to tell us they supported Frelimo, or to tell us 
that they approved of the performance of the president or the national assembly, than 
were re5pondents who thought we were sent by independent sources. 
Second, continuous natural disasters and poverty have made rural citizens suspicious of 
researchers' motives. In a few instances, re5pondents refused to be interviewed, arguing 
that "since they become target group of many researchers, their situation has never 
improved and they were exhausted with questioning". interviewers also observed that 
many local people assumed that the households in which we interviewed were selected to 
provide them things like filrniture, food or blankets. There was also a view that the 
re.spondents selected for interviews were relatives or contacts of the local authorities. 
This situation caused some jealousies, e5pecially in rural communities. Each time, 
interviewers took time to explain to people the purpose of the project and that no would 
received any material benefit from participating. Finally, in some rural areas where 
traditional l1?fluences are still strong, the absence of male heads of households denied 
some v, '0111 en the chance to participate in interviews since they could not obtain their 











Profile of Sample (weighted data) 
Sample size 1400 % 
% Home language 
Gender Portuguese 3 
Male 50 Emakhuwa 25 
Female 50 Cisena 10 
Cindau 5 
Median age 35yr Xichangana 23 
xmyanJa 4 
Location Gitonga 4 
Rural 49 Citswa 5 
Urban 51 Chinyungue 3 
13 others below 2.8 percent 16 
each 
Provinces 
Niassa 8 Income (in Meticais)34 
Cabo Delgado 8 Less than 900 75 
Nampula 9 Up to 1000 14 
Zambezia 9 1001 - 2000 7 
Tete 9 2001 - 4000 3 
Manica 9 4001 - 6000 
Sofala 9 Over 6000 
Inhambane 9 
Gaza 9 Religion 
Maputo (province) 9 None 14 
Maputo (city) 12 Islam 18 
Catholic 32 
Education Protestant (mainstream) 9 
No formal schooling 30 Protestant (evangelical) 16 
Informal schooling only 11 African independent 6 
Primary school (some or complete) 40 Traditional religion 3 
Secondary school (some or complete) 14 Agnostic <1 
Post-secondary education 3 Atheist <1 
Others 1 
Source: Pereira et a!., (2003) Updated in June 28, 2006. 













All the transfonnation or recodes done in this dissertation reflect valid responses, 
including don't know. Missing data, refusals to answer and cases where a question was 
not applicable are excluded from the calculation of any result employing basic or 
advanced statistical technique in this study. 
Support for democracy 
Original fonnat 
3 = democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 
2 = in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 
1 = for someone like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have. 
9 = don't know. 
Recoded fonnat 
2 = democracy is preferable to any other kind of government. 
1 = in some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable. 
o = for someone like me, it doesn't matter what fonn of government we have. 











Rejection of one-party, military, and one-man rule 
Original fonnat 
1 = strongly disapprove 
2 = disapprove 
3 = neither disapprove nor approve 
4 = approve 
5 = strongly approve 
9 = don't know 
Reeoded fonnat 
2 = strongly disapprove 
1 = disapprove 
o = neither disapprove nor approve 
0= approve 
o = strongly approve 
0= don't know 
Procedural versus substantive understandings of democracy 
Original format 
1 = Agree very strongly with A 
2 = agree with A 
3 = agree with B 
4 = agree very strongly with B 
5 = agree with neither 
9 = don't know 
Reeoded fonnat 
5 = Agree very strongly with A 
4 = agree with A 
2 = agree with B 
1 = agree very strongly with B 
3 = agree with neither 













00 = no formal schooling 
01 = informal schooling (including 
Koran schooling) 
02 = some primary schooling 
03 = primary school completed 
04 = some secondary school/high school 
05 = vocational/technical training 
06 = post secondary qualifications, other 
than university 
07 = some university 
08 = university completed 
09 = post graduate 
99 = don't know 
Recoded fomlat 
o = no formal schooling 
o = informal schooling (including Koran 
schooling) 
1 = some primary schooling 
1 = primary school completed 
2 = some secondary school/high school 
2 = vocational/technical training 
3 = post secondary qualifications, other 
than university 
3 = some university 
3 = university completed 
3 = post graduate 
0= don't know 
Getting news from radio, Ilew!<.papers, and television 
Original format 
4 = everyday 
3 = a few times a week 
2 = a few times a month 
1 = less than once a month 
0= never 
9 = don't know 
Recoded format 
4 = everyday 
3 = a few times a week 
2 = a few times a month 
1 = less than once a month 
0= never 











Interest in public affairs 
Original fonnat 
o = not interested 
1 = somewhat interested 
2 = very interested 
9 = don't know 
Intelpersonai discussion ojpolitics 
Original format 
4 = yes, often 
3 = yes, many times 
2 = yes, once or twice 
1 = no, but would do that if had the 
chance 
o = no, would never do this 
9 = don't know 
Participation ill collective action 
Original fonnat 
4 = yes, often 
3 = yes, many times 
2 = yes, once or twice 
1 = no, but would do that if had the 
chance 
o = no, would never do this 
9 = don't know 
Recoded fonnat 
o = not interested 
1 = somewhat interested 
2 = very interested 
0= don't know 
Recorded fonnat 
3 = yes, often 
2 = yes, many times 
1 = yes, once or twice 
o = no, but would do that if had the 
chance 
o = no, would never do this 
o = don't know 
Recoded fonnat 
3 = yes, often 
2 = yes, many times 
1 = yes, once or twice 
o = no, but would do that if had the 
chance 
o = no, would never do this 













3 = official leader 
2 = active member 
1 = inactive member 
o = not a member 
9 = don't know 
Contacting influential persons 
Original format 
0= never 
1= only once 
2 = a few times 
3 = often 
9 = don't know 
Evaluations of economic reform 
Original format 
1 = much worse 
2 = worse 
3 = about the same 
4 = better 
5 = much better 
9 = don't know 
Recoded format 
2 = official leader 
2= active member 
1 = inactive member 
o = not a member 
0= don't know 
Recoded format 
0= never 
1= only once 
2 = a few times 
3 = often 
o = don't know 
Recoded format 
1 = much worse 
2 = worse 
3 = about the same 
4 = better 
5 = much better 











Delivery of political rights 
Original format 
1 = much worse 
2 = worse 
3 = same 
4 = better 
5 = much better 
9 = don't know 
Perceived official corruption 
Original format 
0= none 
1 = some of them 
2 = most of them 
3 = all of them 
9 = don't know 
Pelformance of political incumbents 
Ori ginal format 
1 = strongly disapprove 
2 = disapprove 
3 = approve 
4 = strongly approve 
9 = don't know 
Recoded format 
1 = much worse 
2 = worse 
3 = same 
4 = better 
5 = much better 
3 = don't know 
Recoded format 
0= none 
1 = some of them 
2 = most of them 
3 = all of them 
0= don't know 
Recoded format 
1 = strongly disapprove 
2 = disapprove 
4 = approve 
5 = strongly approve 











Government handling economy 
Original format Recoded format 
I = very badly 1 = very badly 
2 = fairly badly 2 = fairly badly 
3 = fairly well 4 = fairly well 
4 = very well 5 = very well 













Levels and sources of information, cognitive engagement, performance 
evaluations and attitudes to democracy (Bivariate Pearson 's Correlations) 




Interpersonal discussion of politics 
Interest in public affairs 
Sources of information 
Contacting local councilors 
Contacting officials of government 
ministries 
Contacting religious leaders 
Contacting traditional rulers 
Contacting other community influential 
persons 
Identification with the governing party 
Identification with political opposition 
Membership in religious groups 
Membership in trade unions or fann 
associations 
Membership in professional or business 
associations 
Membership in community 
development or self help associations 
Collective actions 
Performance evaluations 
Evaluations of economic reform 
Delivery of political rights 
Perception of official corruption 
Government handling economy 
Performance of political leaders 
Safety from crime or violence 
Present economic evaluations 
Relative economic evaluations 
Retrospective economic evaluations 
Prospective economic evaluations 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 




























































Media usage by urban-rural divide and province 
Getting news from radio by Urban/Rural divide 
Never 
Less than once a month 
A few times a month 





























Never 44 94 68 
Less than once a month 3 1 2 
A few times a month 4 2 3 
A few times a week 13 2 7 
Every day 36 2 19 
Total 100 100 100 




Never 46 91 68 
Less than once a month 9 2 6 
A few times a month 11 3 7 
A few times a week 15 3 9 
Every day 19 2 11 











Getting news from radio b~ Province 
Province Total 
Niassa Cabo Nampula Zambezia Tete Manica Sofala Inhambane Gaza Maputo Maputo 
Delgado (Prov.) (City) 
Never 31 7 23 23 3 14 6 26 24 17 I 15 
Less than once a month I I 8 2 7 3 3 3 I 6 I 3 
A few times a month 6 5 5 7 10 9 4 10 7 12 3 7 
A few times a week 6 26 \3 II 20 16 27 28 17 19 14 18 
Every day 56 62 51 58 60 58 60 33 52 47 81 58 
Total 100 lOa lOa 100 lao lOa lOa lOa 100 lao lOa lOa 
Getting news from television b~ Province 
Province Total 
Niassa Cabo Nampula Zambezia Tete Manica Sofala Inhambane Gaza Maputo Maputo 
Delgado (Prov.) (City) 
Never 85 84 95 86 82 81 63 75 79 75 5 68 
Less than once a month 2 3 2 4 7 2 
A few times a month 4 4 3 2 5 3 5 3 
A few times a week 4 7 3 3 8 4 9 8 6 9 14 7 
Every day 10 7 2 II 5 II 22 13 9 9 68 19 











Getting news from news~a~ers b~ Province 
Province Total 
Niassa Cabo Nampula Zambezia Tete Manica Sofala Inhambane Gaza Maputo Maputo 
Delgado (Prov.) (City) 
Never 82 82 91 83 71 79 60 76 86 77 12 68 
Less than once a month 2 2 8 3 5 5 3 5 18 6 
A few times a month 3 7 4 3 8 3 7 4 4 6 16 7 
A few times a week 3 7 2 4 12 9 18 4 1 7 22 9 
Every day 11 4 3 8 2 6 10 11 7 5 32 1 1 
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